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I. INTRODUCTION
The use of economics has been pervasive in the analysis of litigation.' This
theory when applied to methods of compensating litigators has produced strong
implications for attorney behavior and client welfare.2 The contingent fee arrange-
ment enhances judicial access by shifting the risk of loss to attorneys, and aligns an
attorney's interests with his client's by giving the attorney a stake in case out-
comes Perhaps due to these benefits, the contingent fee has become the most per-
vasive form of financing litigation for plaintiffs in personal injury cases.4 However,
the alignment of interests is imperfect.5 According to economics theory, an attorney
* Professor Thomas is an Associate Professor of Legal Studies and Management at the University of
Florida. Thomas received his A.B degree from Princeton University in 1979, his J.D. degree from Stanford
Law School in 1982, and his Ph.D. from Stanford University in 1989. Professor Thomas would like to grate-
fully acknowledge the research support from the Graduate School of Business at the University of Florida and
the valuable research assistance of Geri N. Davis and B. Joseph Roberts. This article has also benefited from
comments from Tom Dunfee, Jordan Leibman, Tracey Lewis, Virginia Maurer, Dennis Yao, Frank Yates and
participants at the Huber Hurst Seminar at the University of Florida.
1 For an excellent review of this literature, see Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L Rubinfeld, Economic
Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. EcON. LIT. 1067 (1989). Contributions to this review
include Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND. J. EcoN.
404 (1984); Ronald Braeutigam, Bruce Owen, & John Panzar, An Economic Analysis of Alternative Fee
Shifting Systems, 47 LAW & CONT. PROB. 173 (1984); Robert Cooter, Stephen Marks, & Robert Mnookin,
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225
(1982); John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973); William M. Landes,
An Economic Analysis of the Court, 14 J. L. & ECON. 61 (1971); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach
to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settle-
ment, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J.
LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982).
2 The impact of attorney fees on the attomey-client relationship has received as much attention from
the bar and commentators as any other aspect of litigation. See, e.g., LESTER BRICKMAN ET AL., RETHINKING
CONTINGENCY FEES (1994) (arguing that contingent fee attorneys are overpaid and client welfare suffers as a
result); Kevin M. Clermont & John D. Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L REV. 529
(1978) (providing a theoretical analysis that predicts that contingent fee attorneys invest less in case prepara-
tion than is optimal for clients); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Contingent Fees for Lawyers: Their
Impact on Litigation and Accident Prevention, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 382 (1991) (arguing that contingent fee
arrangements do not provide incentives to take due care); Terry Thomason, Are Attorneys Paid What They e
Worth? Contingent Fees and the Settlement Process, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 187 (1991) (arguing that in certain
types of cases clients are better off without representation than with contingent fee attorney representation).
For a history of U.S. legal fee arrangements, see John Leubsdorf Toward a History of the American Rule on
Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 9 (1984).
3 See Miceli & Segerson, supra note 2, at 381.
4 Estimates are that in excess of 95 percent of personal injury cases are taken on a contingent fee
basis. Note, Settling for Less: Applying Law and Economics to Poor People, 107 HARV. L. REV. 442, 448
n.23 (1993) (citing JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT
LITIGATION 37 (1986)).
5 See Clermont & Currivan, supra note 2, at 536 ("In sum, neither the certain hourly fee nor the
contingent percentage fee can align fully the economic interests of lawyer and client").
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has an incentive to shirk (perform less work than his client prefers) in preparing
cases because he receives only a fraction of the client's return. Hence, if we accept
the economic assumption that actors behave in the selfish, self-interested fashion
known as utility-maximization,6 an attorney stops investing time and resources in a
case when his return is maximized, an event that occurs before the client's return is
maximized.7 Thus, economics suggests that the judicial access that the contingent
fee arrangement provides comes at a high price.
Although quite elegant, the economic theory of contingent fee behavior
fails to account for at least two psychological phenomena that can cause deviations
from economic predictions. First, attorneys are susceptible to face-saving behavior
which is the psychological desire to avoid embarrassment, appearing foolish or
being wrong. Secondly, attorneys are subject to escalating commitment. This phe-
nomenon occurs when an individual increases his investment to often irrational
levels in a failing or risky course of action because to cease such investments is
equivalent to admitting failure. These prevalent behaviors are well documented in
the psychology literature. 8 An individual frequently validates his actions by in-
creasing investment in the relevant activity in order to avoid prospective failure and
an accompanying loss of status. For example, when put on hold, an individual often
refuses to hang up even though the wait is unacceptably long. At this point, the
caller often continues investing time in the phone call because hanging up would be
a tacit admission that he wasted time by holding too long. In such situations the
loss of status is personal due to the confirmation that the caller made an incorrect
decision.? As a result, the caller may find that he must validate the increased in-
vestment, leading to yet greater investments in the failing' enterprise. 0 In other
words the longer the caller stays on hold the harder it is to terminate the phone call
due to his ever-increasing time investment. If attorneys fall into this cycle of ra-
tionalization and augmented investment, then the shirking implications of eco-
nomic theory may not apply to those contingent fee cases.
6 Utility is a concept that generally applies to preference rankings. When used with maximization,
it typically refers to a measure of satisfaction, welfare, happiness or even pleasure. See ROBERT COOTER &
THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 22-23 (1988). Thus, a utility maximizer is someone who tries to
maximize his level of satisfaction.
7 See Mark P. Gergen, Use of Open Terms in Contracts, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 997, 1011 (1992). See
also infra discussion accompanying notes 24-28.
8 See generally D. Ramona Bobocel & John P. Meyer, Escalating Commitment to a Failing Course
ofAction: Separating the Roles of Choice and Justification, 79 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL 360 (1994); Joel Brock-
ner, The Escalation of Commitment to a Failing Course of Action: Toward Theoretical Progress, 17 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 39 (1992); JOEL BROCKNER & JEFFREY Z. RuBIN, ENTRAPMENT IN ESCALATING CONFLICTS: A
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1985); Barry M. Staw, Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Esca-
lating Commitment to a Chosen Course oflction, 16 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. PERF. 27 (1976).
9 Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Psychological Traps, in NEGOTIATION: READINGS, EXERCISES, AND CASES 209
(Roy J. Lewicki et al. eds, 1993).
10 See infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
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In this article, I develop a theory that addresses the paradox of why some
contingent fee attorneys shirk while others work hard. I posit that the presence of
critical scrutiny, which has been identified as promoting escalating commitment in
other settings, promotes similar behavior in high stakes litigation. The escalation
literature identifies scrutiny from a critical audience as one of the factors that in-
crease the probability that an individual succumbs to the entrapping effects of es-
calation and face-saving behavior.11 An additional factor contributing to escalation
is the existence of a competitive environment.12 I argue that almost all litigation is
competitive, and most high-stakes and high profile cases are subject to scrutiny 3
that is evaluative or critical in nature.14 Thus, it is likely that contingent fee attor-
neys are more prone to escalating commitment in high stakes and high profile
cases. Thus, while contingent fee attorneys in low stakes cases are likely to shirk
due to the relative anonymity under which they toil, attorneys in high stakes cases
who are subjected to critical scrutiny are likely to work in excess of the levels that
economic theory predicts.
In Part II, I begin the analysis with a review of three economic models of
contingent fee attorney behavior. Economics has modeled contingent fee attorneys
as selfish utility-maximizers,' 5 competitive firms,16 and agents in principal-agent
11 Bert R. Brown, Saving Face, in NEGOTIATION: READINGS, EXERCISES, AND CASES 308,313 (Roy
J. Lewicki et al. eds., 1993).
12 See BROCKNER & RUBIN, supra note 8, at 58-65.
13 The level of scrutiny increases with the notoriety of the case. Coverage can range from minor
newspaper articles to heavy electronic media coverage in the most famous cases. See John F. Onion, Jr., Mass
Media's Impact on Litigation: A Judge's Perspective, 14 REv. LITIG. 585 (1995) (discussing the media's
fascination with high profile criminal cases). This media attention also applies to civil cases. See, e.g., Robert
C. Weaver, Jr., Sixth Amendment At Peril: The Media Frenzy Surrounding the Tonya Harding Cases, 4 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 53 (1995); JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES (1991) (examining the case of the dis-
graced, former Wall Street Financier Michael Milken); PETER TRUELL & LARRY GURWIN, FALSE PROFITS:
THE INSIDE STORY OF BCCI, THE WORLD'S MOST CORRUPT FINANCIAL EMPIRE (1992) (discussing the
indictment of former Presidential Cabinet secretary Clark Clifford for involvement in the BCCI scandal);
Owesly J. Smith, The Heat Over McDonald's Coffee, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, June 19, 1995 at
A19 (recounting the story of Stella Liebeck, the 79-year-old grandmother, who received a multi-million
dollar judgment against McDonalds after receiving third-degree bums from spilt hot coffee). Noting the entry
of a 24-hour cable network known as Court TV devoted exclusively to broadcasting and analyzing trials, one
commentator observed that the media coverage and outlets for such coverage, "has jumped by a startling
amount" Jonathan M. Moses, Legal Spin Control: Ethics And Advocacy In The Court Of Public Opinion 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1811, 1812 n.5 (1995).
14 The media does not simply cover trials, it dissects and criticizes them. As the attorney for figure
skater Tonya Harding in her "knee breaking" conspirey case observed, "press coverage is almost uniformly
cynical. In my judgment, there seems to be less and less distinction between editorializing and news report-
ing." Weaver, supra note 13, at 57. See also infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
Is See, e.g., Clermont & Currivan, supra note 2, at 543-46; Michael A Dover, Contingent Percent-
age Fees: An Economic Analysis, 51 J. AIR L. & COM. 531, 551 (1980); Murray L. Schwartz & Daniel J. B.
Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, 22 STAN. L REv. 1125,
1133-36 (1970).
16 See Patricia M. Danzon, Contingent Fees for Personal Injury Litigation, 14 BELL J. ECON. 213,
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models.1 7 Although providing valuable insights about contingent fee attorney be-
havior, the models do not provide an explanation for why contingent fee attorneys
do not either all shirk or all work diligently. In Part III, I argue that the answer to
this question is that in certain cases attorneys are especially susceptible to the psy-
chological dynamics of escalation. Specifically, attorneys are pressured by highly
critical scrutiny in high stakes and high profile cases. The pressure from this scru-
tiny increases the probability that attorneys escalate their commitment. In Part IV, I
describe an experiment that I conducted to test the implications of escalation theory
for contingent fee attorney behavior. These experimental results, although not de-
finitive, provide unequivocal support for the susceptibility of attorneys to escalating
commitment. In Part V, I consider the theory's implications. In particular, I exam-
ine the implications of face-saving and escalating commitment on reform measures
designed to increase client returns at the expense of shirking attorneys. Finally, I
conclude that proposals that increase the allowable contingent percentage based on
the stage of litigation may be counterproductive by encouraging escalating com-
mitment. Instead, graduated fee limits are more likely to achieve the desired redis-
tribution with fewer pitfalls, whereas more invasive proposals may curtail the ac-
cessibility of the judicial system in low-to-moderate-stakes cases.
II. ECONOMIC MODELS OF CONTINGENT FEE BEHAVIOR
This section examines economic models of contingent fee behavior. These
analyses treated the contingent fee attorney as a utility maximizer, a competitive
firm, or as an agent of his client-principal.18 The implications of each of these mod-
els are strikingly different, yet all fail to fully capture the differences in contingent
fee behaviors.
A. Utility Maximization
Schwartz and Mitchell provided the first formal economic critique of con-
tingent fee arrangements.19 They assumed that 1) attorneys' actions are independent
of defendants' actions,2° 2) attorneys are self-interested utility maximizers, 2' and 3)
216-17 (1983). In economics, competition means that there are multiple firms in a market in which no single
firm's decisions have a substantial impact on the market price of goods sold in the market. See COOTER &
ULEN, supra note 6, at 37-38.
17 See, e.g., Bruce L. Hay, Contingent Fees andAgency Costs, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (1996); Geof-
frey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1987).
18 See, e.g., Clermont & Currivan, supra note 2 (the attorney as utility-maximizer); Schwartz &
Mitchell, supra note 15 (the attorney as utility-maximizer); Danzon, supra note 16 (the attorney as a com-
petitive firm); Miller, supra note 17 (the attorney as agent); Hay, supra note 17 (the attorney as agent).
19 Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 15. Their analysis was preceded by MacKinnon's seminal em-
pirical research. See F.B. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICEs 43 (1964).
20 The alternative is a game-theoretical model which explicitly recognizes that the actions of any
5
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clients' expected returns increase with attorney effort at a decreasing rate. The ini-
tial assumption means that the contingent fee attorney does not have to worry about
the defense attorney's decisions or case. Thus, whether the plaintiff's attorney faces
an incompetent adversary or an experienced, diligent, Order-of-the-Coif, top of the
class law school graduate, he makes the same litigation decisions. Although this
assumption is rather unrealistic, its primary purpose is to simplify the analysis. The
second assumption means that an attorney takes an action if and only if it increases
his return relative to the opportunity costs2 of taking the action. There is no charity
or self-sacrifice in the model, and attorneys definitely do not put clients' interests
before their own. In its most extreme form, the assumption suggests that an attor-
ney will refuse to take an action that would increase his client's return by one mil-
lion dollars if the action would reduce the attorney's return by one dollar.23
The third and final assumption, although not as controversial, is significant
in that it suggests that clients are better off with more attorney effort rather than
less. Additional effort may not increase a client's expected return in every case, but
when averaged over many cases clients benefit from the effort. Moreover, the as-
sumption indicates that initial effort is more productive than supplemental effort.
Clearly initial acts such as filing the case, arranging to have a defendant served, and
appearing at all court proceedings are critical. Failure to take these actions insures
almost certain defeat, whereas performing these actions gives a client a positive
probability of obtaining a significant settlement or winning. However, there are
limits to the benefits of additional effort. The strongest witness to testify on an is-
sue usually has greater probative impact than the tenth or eleventh strongest wit-
ness. Eventually an additional witness used to prove the same point adds virtually
nothing to a client's case. The same logic applies to case authority. Using a few
authorities to support an argument may be quite powerful. However, at some point
an additional authority increases the strength of the argument less than the previ-
ously used authority. This decreasing-returns assumption is key to the shirking
implication of the utility-maximization model.
economic actor are influenced by the decisions and actions of other economic actors. See generally DAVID M.
KREPS, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELING (1990); DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL, GAME THEORY AND
THE LAW (1994).
21 Schwartz and Mitchell assume that the attorney can receive a fixed wage per hour working else-
where. See Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 15, at 1127-1128. Therefore, the profit received from the case is
the return in excess of the opportunity wage of devoting effort elsewhere.
22 Opportunity costs are the economic costs of a forgone alternative action. For example, when an
individual attends law school, he pays tuition and forgoes the income he would have received from working.
Hence, his opportunity costs after the first year of law school include his alternative annual salary, tuition plus
the return on that amount had he invested it. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 6 at 35. An attorney's oppor-
tunity costs include the return he could have received by investing his time in alternative cases. Thus, if it is
possible for a contingent fee attorney who spends 100 hours on a case to take other cases with an hourly fee
of$100 per hour, the attorney's opportunity costs are $10,000.
23 But see Stephen Pearlstein, The Economist as Ebenezer Scrooge, WASH. PosT, August 25,1994, at
B9 (reviewing research that suggests that the selfish and uncooperative behavior, integral assumptions of
microeconomic theory, may be learned or acquired behaviors).
[Vol. 101:327
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In deciding whether to increase his effort, a utility-maximizing contingent
fee attorney compares the increase in his personal expected return to the cost of
undertaking additional effort.24 An attorney increases his effort if and only if the
added benefit exceeds the added cost. The problem is that an attorney's personal
expected return is less than the client's expected return. In other words, a contin-
gent fee attorney receives some fraction or percentage of his client's return.21 This
fractional share coupled with decreasing returns to effort causes an attorney's mar-
ginal increase in expected return due to additional effort to be less than the overall
increase in his client's expected return. Hence, the marginal increase in expected
return that an attorney compares to his marginal costs is less than the total increase
in expected return. An attorney, in essence, undervalues the benefits of additional
effort and, accordingly, declines to take actions whose total expected benefits ex-
ceed attorney costs. 26 This undervaluation leads to the attorney exerting less effort
than plaintiffs would choose to maximize their net returns.
To illustrate, suppose that you can assign numerical values to five possible
actions that an attorney can take to improve his case prospects. For simplicity, each
action has an identical cost of 12 using the same measurement units as expected
benefits. The expected benefit of each of the actions from most beneficial to least is
60, 45, 30, 15, and 6. A hypothetical hourly fee attorney, whose interests are per-
fectly aligned with the plaintiff's, performs all but the last action. Each of the four
most beneficial actions provides a net positive expected benefit of at least three.
The plaintiff rejects only the last action, with a gross expected benefit of 6 and a net
return of-6.
A contingent fee attorney views this choice set quite differently. A contin-
gent fee attorney, receiving one-third of the plaintiffs total litigation return, per-
ceives these five actions as providing him with personal expected benefits of 20,
15, 10, 5, and 2. When weighed against his costs of 12 per action, the utility-
maximizing attorney performs only the two most beneficial actions: the two whose
benefits exceed the attorney's marginal costs. Each of the three least beneficial
actions leaves the attorney with a personal return of at best negative two. Thus, in
our example, the utility-maximizing attorney performs only two actions, half the
24 An expected value, whether utility, benefit, return or cost, is the sum of the probabilities of each
possible outcome times the value of each of those outcomes. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 6, at 56.
Hence, if there are two possible returns, the first with a one-third probability and the second with a two-thirds
probability, the expected return is one-third times the first return plus two-thirds times the second return.
25 This contingent percentage is typically one-third, although, there can be a wide variance. One
commentator stated that fees range from 25%-40%. Richard M. Bimholz, The Validity and Propriety of
Contingent Fee Controls, 37 UCLA L REV. 949 (1990). Other commentators have indicated that fees can
range up to 50%. See LESTER BRiCKMAN ET AL, supra note 2, at 13.
26 For detailed analyses of this argument, See Clermont & Currivan, supra note 2, at 543-546 (pro-
viding a graphical analysis); Danzon, supra note 16, at 215 (providing a mathematical analysis).
27 The choice of a hypothetical hourly fee attorney with perfectly aligned interests is the baseline
used in other analyses. See, e.g., Clermont & Currivan, supra note 2; Danzon, supra note 16. The benefit of
this baseline is that it the attorney becomes a mere conduit of the plaintiff's interests.
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actions that the plaintiff prefers that he perform. The implications of the utility-
maximization model is that a plaintiff might reap a net positive return from the
attorney questioning six or seven witnesses, whereas a contingent fee attorney
would be willing to question at most four or five witnesses. Hence, attorneys pro-
vide suboptimal representation under contingent fee arrangements.28
B. The Competitive Model ofAttorney Behavior
With limited barriers to entry and a plethora of attorneys, one would ex-
pect the legal services market to be perfectly competitive.29 Many contingent fee
attorneys make real economic profits, and there is little indication that they dis-
count their services. 30 This characteristic suggests that there is limited competition
in the market for attorney services. However, Professor Danzon notes in her study
that there can be competition without price discounts.31 In order to compete for
future cases without offering discounts, a competitive attorney must choose actions
that distinguish his practice from the practices of competitors.
The following exposition tracks Danzon's competitive model. Quality as
well as price is typically used to differentiate products from those of competitors.32
This dimension is available to attorneys as well. Whereas price is the most common
dimension on which firms compete, attorneys are more likely to use quality to dis-
tinguish their services. An attorney can discount his contingent percentage to attract
clients. However, a plaintiff with a strong claim might be reticent to accept such
discounts unless he is convinced that the attorney is willing and able to provide
28 The actual conflict between contingent attorney and client is actually greater than Schwartz and
Mitchell suggested because the contingent fee client incurs no costs, and therefore, cannot have interests
aligned with a contingent fee attorney who incurs costs. Hence, the contingent fee client faces a zero marginal
cost of effort, and therefore, prefers his attorney to work until the marginal return of additional effort is zero.
However, such an outcome is no more optimal than that produced by the contingent fee attorney's decision
because the costs of performing marginal actions far exceed their costs.
This analysis carefully avoids the issue of social optimality because of the complexity of this issue. A true
consideration of optimality not only would include attorney's costs and client benefits but externalities such
as the cost of the publicly provided judiciary and the impact of erroneous decisions on precedent creation and
behavior. See GORDON TULLOCK, TRIALS ON TRIAL 5, 14-15 (1980). Tullock argues that social optimality is
achieved when all litigation costs are minimized and decision accuracy is maximized. Instead of addressing
social optimality, I instead adopt the defacto standard in fee research maximizing the client's welfare net the
hourly fee value of attorney effort. See Clermont & Currivan, supra note 2, at 543; Danzon, supra note 16, at
214-215.
29 A market is perfectly competitive when there are so many sellers that all sellers accept the given
market price and receive zero economic profits. Clearly there are attorneys who make substantial economic
profits. See DEREK BOK, THE COST OF TALENT, 139-140 (1993) (asserting that contingent fees have made
some attorneys millionaires).
30 See Danzon, supra note 16, at 214.
31 See id.
32 See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 281-287 (1988).
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high quality representation.33 A discounted contingent fee is no bargain if the attor-
ney is unable to bargain effectively for a fair settlement. In a case that settles for a
million dollars, a one-third reduction in a thirty percent contingency might initially
save the plaintiff $100,000. However, if a more skilled attorney could have ob-
tained a $2 million settlement, then the plaintiff is worse off by $600,000.34 There-
fore, given the wide differences in outcome that may be attributed to the attorney's
ability, many plaintiffs, especially those in high stakes cases, are likely to be more
concerned about the quality of the representation rather than price. Therefore, es-
tablishing a reputation as a provider of high quality legal representation is likely to
be a more effective strategy for maximizing long-term returns. If an attorney devel-
ops a reputation for putting his own interests ahead of his client's, then he is not
likely to compete well for cases with high expected returns. Without such cases, the
attorney's practice is unlikely to thrive. His practice will consist of weak and mar-
ginal cases or cases with low expected returns. The attorney is likely to draw poor
and unsophisticated clients who either have trouble obtaining the services of attor-
neys with better reputations, or who do not search for high quality representation.'
Although obtaining clients in this manner may occasionally gamer a large return
3 Second-tier liberal arts colleges termed this paradox the "Chivas Regal" effect during the tuition
run-up of the 1980s. These'colleges found that reduced or discounted tuition actually lowered applications
rather than increasing them. Prospective students used the lower tuition of such institutions as a signal of
inferior quality rather than a signal of a bargain. Hence, instead of increasing the yield of top students, the
lower tuition actually left the schools with less high quality students than the high tuition. Morning Edition:
College Costs Rise - More Slowly (National Public Radio broadcast, April 21, 1997) (Transcript no.
97042106-210).
Analogously, rather than attracting clients, fee discounts may signal clients that the quality of the
attorney's representation is lacking. With limited information about attorney ability, plaintiffs are likely to
search for alternative information to serve as proxies for attorney ability. Under certain conditions, the dis-
count may signal plaintiffs that the discounting attorney is unlikely to provide high quality service. Although
any attorney can charge the going contingent rate or high rates, high quality attorneys will not give discounts.
The value of their representation is high, and their costs may be higher as well reflecting the incremental
investment they put into representing clients. As a result their costs are likely to be higher making it infeasible
to give discounts. Therefore, an attorney who offers a discount signals to the plaintiff that costs are low, or
that he is not yet established. The low cost may be indicative of substandard effort, whereas an attorney who
is not established may not have the experience necessary to provide high quality service. In either case, the
discount signals the plaintiffthat he is unlikely to find high quality representation with the discounting attor-
ney. For a discussion of the informational value of signaling see TIROLE, supra note 32, at 118-21.
34 Under a 30% contingent fee arrangement, the client'receives $700,000 of the $1 million settlement
or $800,000 after the discount In the undiscounted case that yields $2 million the client receives $1.4 million.
Therefore, the client by choosing the more expensive attorney gains $600,000. This example raises intriguing
implications for recent debates about contingent fee arrangements. Many commentators have expressed
dismay at the exorbitant imputed hourly fee rate of some contingent fee attorneys. See, e.g., Lester Brickman,
Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmark?. 37 UCLA L. REv. 29, 76
n.186 (1989); BRICKMAN, et al., supra note 2, at 55 n.24; J. GOLDEN, THE MILLION-DOLLAR LAWYERS 64-65
(1978); Warden, Should a Lawyer Make $10,000 an Hour? STUDENT LAW., Apr. 1981, at 21-23. However,
perhaps a better question is whether the value added by the attorney exceeds additional fees. An attorney who
increases client's net return by $600,000 in exchange for an addition $300,000 in fees may be worth a
$10,000 imputed hourly fee.
35 See Claire Cooper, Hard Life for Lawyer in Death Row Appeal, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 24,1995,
atAl.
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for the attorney, an attorney who fails to establish a reputation for providing high
quality representation is unlikely to consistently attract the most lucrative cases.
In order to establish a reputation as a high quality provider of legal serv-
ices, an attorney must put forth effort that exceeds that of the utility-maximizing
attorney. However, if all or many attorneys adopt this strategy, an attorney would
have to exert still more effort in order to distinguish his practice. Any attorney who
establishes a reputation for investing more effort and money in his cases than all
other attorneys is likely to have a competitive advantage over other attorneys vying
for the same cases. Establishing such a reputation is extremely difficult. In a com-
petitive environment, all participating attorneys have an incentive to match or ex-
ceed other attorneys' case investments. This game of outspending competitors has
its limits. An attorney must avoid bankrupting his practice by investing excessively
in cases. Therefore, the most that any attorney invests in a case is an amount that
gives him an expected return of zero.3 In a perfectly competitive environment, this
amount is also the lowest amount invested. 7 If the attorney invests less, then other
attorneys outbid him for the best cases leaving the under-investing attorney mar-
ginal cases only. Hence, in equilibrium, all attorneys invest at an effort level that
leaves them with zero-profit returns. Under these conditions, the competitive con-
tingent fee attorney exerts the same level of effort that the hypothetical interests-
aligned attorney chooses.a3 Thus, under the competitive model, contingent fee at-
torneys maximize client welfare.
C. The Agency Model ofAttorney Behavior
Neither the utility-maximization nor the competitive model completely de-
scribes contingent fee attorney behavior. The utility-maximization model provides
a good explanation of attorney behavior in low stakes litigation but fails to describe
the behavior of elite, 'superstar' attorneys who specialize in high-stakes liability
cases. These attorneys invest enormous resources in their cases and often obtain
substantial judgments and settlements as a result of their efforts. 9 Undoubtedly,
36 For an illustration of the misfortunes that may befall an attorney who fails to heed bankruptcy
constraint and overinvests in a case see id
37 See Danzon, supra note 16.
38 See id. The benefit of using the hypothetical interests-aligned attorney as the baseline is that the
attorney becomes a mere conduit for the plaintiff's interests.
39 Others have recognized that contingent fee attorneys who successfully differentiated their services
can obtain above average fees for their services. In decrying this phenomenon, former Harvard Law School
Dean Derek Bok stated:
There are famous plaintiffs' attorneys who preside over a stable of associates and suc-
ceed, year in and year out, in earning incomes of more than $I million. Because of their
reputation, these attorneys are asked to take many more cases than they can handle. As a
result, they can pick and choose more carefully and hence confine their efforts to claims
that are likely to produce big verdicts or generous settlements. In this way, they can ex-
ploit the rigid contingent fee structure and reap huge rewards for the effort they expend.
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utility-maximizing behavior in response to withering defense efforts by deep-
pocketed corporations is unlikely to produce the large court awards that have
prompted popular calls for tort reform. On the other hand, the competitive model
provides a better description of attorney behavior in high-stakes cases. Attorneys
behaving competitively are more likely to match and, perhaps, exceed the invest-
ment of deep-pocketed defense teams. However, the persistence of attorneys who
provide inadequate representation is clearly inconsistent with the competitive
model.41 The competitive model also fails to explain how a contingent fee attorney
profits from his efforts. The model predicts that competing attorneys will bid prof-
its to zero by increasing their work effort. Yet a small but significant percentage of
contingent fee attorneys obtain substantial positive returns from their efforts. 2 The
persistence of such success is inconsistent with competition. Hence, whereas each
model provides descriptive power for certain cases, neither model satisfactorily
explains the full range of contingent fee attorney involvement.
The agency model provides an alternative description of contingent fee be-
havior by recognizing that the structure of the attorney-client relationship as well as
case characteristics influence attorney behavior.43 Under agency theory, the attor-
BoK, supra note 29, 139-40, as quoted in BRICKMAN ET AL.., supra note 2, at 56 n.26. What Bok does not
consider in his denunciation is the benefit that plaintiffs receive from hiring these high priced attorneys.
40 I discuss some of these proposed reforms below. See infra Part V.B.
41 Substantial literature suggests that attorneys frequently do not exert even the minimum effort
necessary to satisfy fiduciary obligations. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the
Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U.L.
REV. 760, 800 (1995) (recounting horror stories of inexperienced, drunk, and sleeping attorneys representing
defendants in capital murder cases); Geraldine Mund, Paralegals: The Good, The Bad and the Ugly, 2 Am
BANKR. INST. L REv. 337, 343 (1994) (observing that some appointed attorneys in bankruptcy hearings are
"mere drones who give inadequate representation"); Deborah L Rhode, Gender and Professional Roles, 63
FORDHAM L. REV. 39, 54 (1994) (asserting that the United States tolerates inadequate representation for those
who cannot afford competent counsel).
42 One of the criticisms of the contingent fee arrangement is that attorneys profit excessively, often
receiving case returns that are disproportionately large relative to case risk, and annual incomes that exceed
those of their hourly fee counterparts. Professor Brickman has illuminated this point in several articles. See
Lester Brickman, On the Relevance of the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: Tort System Outcomes are
Principally Determined by Lawyer's Rates of Return, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 1755, 1773-74 nn.57-60 (1994)
(citing hourly fee rates of return for contingent fee attorneys of $30,000-$50,000 per hour); Brickman, supra
note 34, at 102-03 (From the perspective of a plaintiff seeking to sell a claim on a contingent fee basis, "law-
yers have been instrumental in creating a tort system which overcompensates lawyers, undercompensates
many claimants, and creates barriers to nonlawyer competition in the claims invoking process."); BRCKMAN
ETAL, supra note 2, at 15.
43 Agency is a common law concept In recent years economists have explicated and modeled the
complex cost and incentive issues associated with agency in contract See, e.g., Eugene Fama, Agency Prob-
lems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL ECON. 288 (1980); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, An
Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem, 51 ECONOMETRICA 7 (1983); Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and
Observability, 10 BELL J. EcoN. 74 (1979); Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and
Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55 (1979). Business management scholars have augmented the work of
economists by applying agency principles to management studies. See, e.g., S. Baiman, Agency Research in
ManagerialAccounting: A Second Look, 15 ACCT. ORG. & SOC'Y. 341 (1990); R. E. Hoskisson & M A. Hitt,
Antecedents and Performance Outcomes of Diversification: A Review and Critique of Theoretical Perspec-
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ney acts as agent for his client-principal in litigation. The attorney's utility depends
on the size of his expected return from the case and how hard he has to work to get
it. Agency assumes, quite reasonably, that the attorney prefers to make as much
money as possible but strongly dislikes working hard. The attorney accepts the case
provided its expected return exceeds the return he can obtain from employing his
efforts in his best alternative activity. The return from this activity is called his
reservation wage. Under the simplest agency model, the agent's effort choice is
binary; he either shirks or works hard.44 The client is better off if the attorney works
hard. Hence, there is an inherent conflict of interest between attorney and client.
Therefore, the client's task within the context of contingent fee arrangements is to
enter into a feasible contract with the attorney that elicits hard work.
This exercise is no simple task because attorneys prefer to shirk rather than
work hard. In a perfect world, the client executes a contract under which he pays
his attorney x if he shirks and x+d if he works hard choosing d to be sufficiently
greater than x to elicit hard work. The problem with this strategy is that the attor-
ney's effort is unobservable. If the client could monitor his attorney's efforts then
he could implement the strategy. However, monitoring is neither practical nor fea-
sible. It is unlikely that any attorney would agree to the constant monitoring re-
quired to insure hard work. Even if the client could conceivably monitor the attor-
ney, he typically does not have the expertise to assess his attorriey's behavior. An
unsophisticated client does not know whether the attorney has researched the issues
adequately, deposed all necessary witnesses, or discovered all relevant evidence.45
Therefore, although the client's interest is effort, he must base the contract on an
observable proxy.
A common effort proxy identified in economics textbooks is the outcome
or, for litigation, the case return.46 Assume, for the moment, that litigation has a
binary outcome, the plaintiff either wins or loses.47 Depending on the probabilities
tives, 16 J. MGMT 461 (1979); R. Kosnik & K. Bettenhausen, Agency Theory and the Motivational Effect of
Management Compensation, 17 GROUP & ORG. MGMT. 309 (1992); Henry L. Tosi et al., Disaggregating the
Agency Contract: The Effects of Monitoring, Incentive Alignment, and Term in Office on Agent Decision
Making, 40 ACAD. MGMT J. 584 (1997). Recently, legal commentators have investigated the impact of
agency principles on the attorney-client relationship. See Miller, supra note 17; Hay, supra note 17.
44 For a fairly elementary exposition of the agency problem that utilizes a binary choice space, see
DAVID M. KREPs, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMic THEORY, 578-583 (1990).
45 See Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 635 (1985)
(noting that clients are not always in a position to monitor attorney actions). The attorney is likely to exert
substantial influence on litigation decisions regardless of the level of monitoring due to his superior experi-
ence and legal expertise. Hence, the attorney has the power to make decisions in the attorney's favor, and not
the plaintiffs, by persuading the plaintiff that the action is in the plaintiffs best interests. See Bimholz, supra
note 25, at 955.
4 See KREPS, supra note 44.
47 This binary assumption has been the basis of a significant debate in the law and economics litera-
ture. Priest and Klein's now famous prediction that plaintiffs win 50% of tried cases implicitly assumes a
binary outcome. George L Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1984). However, the outcome of trial is rarely clearly a victory or a loss. A judgment for the plain-
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of winning with and without high attorney effort, the client might offer to pay the
attorney x-e if he loses the case, and x+d for winning the case. For example, sup-
pose the attorney's reservation wage is 90, high effort costs the attorney 25, and his
probability of winning the case with high effort is .8. Also assume that his prob-
ability of winning with low effort is .2, and the cost of low effort is zero. The client
can offer the attorney a contract under which the attorney receives 75 if he loses the
case and 130 if he wins the case. Under this scenario, the attorney could exert low
effort under the contract and receive
(.8)(75) + (.2)(130) -0 = 86.
Alternatively, he can work hard under the contract and receive
(.2)(75) + (.8)(130) - 25 = 94.
A risk-neutral attorney accepts this contract and works hard because the contract
gives him an expected return in excess of his reservation wage. Moreover, he does
not shirk under the contract because to do so leaves him with nearly 4 less than his
reservation wage. Assuming that the client's return from winning the case exceeds
130, this incentive-based contract elicits behavior that maximizes the client's gross
return.
Characteristics of contingent fee arrangements make implementing an in-
centive-based contract for plaintiffs' attorneys difficult. Plaintiff's attorney com-
pensation almost certainly is limited to a contingent fee in most civil cases due to
the entrenchment of this fee arrangement in the United States.' On the plus side,
contingent fee arrangements are very similar to the incentive-inducing contracts
outlined in the preceding paragraph. Under contingent fee arrangements attorneys
are rewarded for improving their clients' return. If an attorney performs poorly and
the client loses, the attorney receives no return. However, the standard one-third
contingency is hardly optimal. In order for the contract to provide a sufficient in-
centive to induce optimal effort, the return from the best outcome must be 1) large
enough to provide the attorney with an expected return that exceeds his reservation
wage, and 2) sufficiently greater than the downside outcome to make the gain from
investing additional costly effort worthwhile.49 Under a contingent fee arrangement
tiff can hardly be termed a victory if it fails to cover the plaintiffs costs or if the plaintiff had previously
rejected a settlement offer for an amount greater than thejudgment See Samuel R Gross & Kent D. Syverud,
Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MIC. L REV. 319,
336 (1991); Donald Wittman, Is the Selection of Cases for Trial Biased? 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 185 (1985).
However, for the purposes of this simple illustration, the binary assumption is sufficient.
48 Professor Hay explicitly recognizes this issue by rejecting the question of what the optimal fee
arrangement is, and instead asking what the optimal contingent percentage should be given the pervasiveness
of this fee arrangement See Hay, supra note 17, at 504-505.
49 In the principal-agent literature, the first condition is known as a participation constraint because it
must be satisfied for the attorney to take the case, and the second is called the incentive constraint because it
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the first condition is likely satisfied anytime an attorney accepts a case. An attorney
who too often takes cases with negative attorney expected returns soon goes bank-
rupt.5° The second condition is difficult to satisfy with a contingent fee arrange-
ment. Satisfaction of this condition provides the incentive to work hard. Unless the
increased attorney benefit from exerting high rather than low effort exceeds the
cost of working harder, the attorney shirks.
In low stakes cases, an attorney's contingent fee return from hard work is
unlikely to be sufficiently greater than his low-effort return to induce him to work
hard. For example, suppose that a case has a payoff of $3000 and the hourly fee
value of the attorney's time is $100. If the attorney works hard and wins, his $1000
share under a standard contingent fee arrangement is likely to be too low to induce
him to work hard if he can settle the case with little or no effort. Suppose he can
settle the case for $1200 and receive a $400 attorney share with low effort. Then
unless he can achieve the hard-effort result with less than six additional hours, he
does not continue the case.51 Hence, it is highly unlikely that the contingent fee
contract by itself can induce hard work in moderate-stakes cases.52 Monitoring also
is unlikely to increase attorney effort in moderate-stakes cases. The expertise dif-
ferential makes it difficult for the client in these cases to accurately evaluate his
observations.- Moreover, even if effective monitoring were feasible, it is unlikely
to elicit the desired response without a greater attorney return. Without the larger
return, the attorney could not exert the additional effort without losing money.
Thus, the contingent fee arrangement is not conducive to eliciting hard work from
attorneys in low to moderate stakes cases.5
The contingent fee contract comes closer to eliciting welfare-maximizing
effort in high stakes cases but is still inadequate. In high-stakes cases the high effort
expected return is more likely to be sufficiently larger than the low-effort expected
induces optimal behavior. See KREPS, supra note 44, at 585.
50 See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 35.
51 In an empirical study on attomey compensation, the average number of hours for contingent fee
attorneys was 47.9 and exceeded 30 for low stakes cases. See Herbert M. Kritzer et al., The Impact of Fee
Arrangement on Lawyer Effort, 19 LAw & SOC'Y REv. 251, 266-267 (1985).
52 This deviation may not be as stark as the example suggests. The contingent fee attorney may be
able to take advantage of the high transaction costs that accompany litigation in order to obtain settlements
that are as high or greater than the expected return from working hard. The defense may be willing to pay a
substantial settlement in order to avoid extended litigation. See Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits
on the Settlement of Litigation, 10 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 26 (1990). Thus, even if the hard-work expected
return does not exceed the attorney's cost difference between hard and low work, the plaintiff can still obtain
a payoff close to the hard-work expected return.
53 See Birnholz, supra note 25, at 954 ("As a result, most clients generally will defer to the attorney's
expertise and agree with the attorney's estimate of the risk and value of their case . . . ."); Rhode, supra note
45.
54 See supra note 36 and accompanying text
55 One study suggests that the limits of moderate stakes is about $6000. See Kritzer et al., supra note
51, at 267.
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return to elicit hard work. For example, if you scale the preceding illustration by a
factor of ten, then the attorney's shirk-work decision depends on whether he can
win the case with 60 or less hours, an event that is more likely to occur at this effort
level. What this means is, whereas the attorney may prefer to settle a $3000 case
when a $1200 settlement is available, there is a much higher probability that the
attorney continues to contest a $30,000 dispute rather than accept a $12,000 settle-
ment offer. Scale the illustration by a larger factor, and the incentive to work hard
is even greater. Hence, when stakes are greater the attorney likely works harder and
obtains a greater proportion of the maximum possible expected return.'
However, the nearly continuous nature of both potential payoffs and effort
levels may prevent a client from receiving welfare-maximizing effort from his at-
torney. In the agency examples the attorney is faced with a binary effort choice.5'
In reality, the attorney's effort choice is essentially continuous and each effort
choice has a distinct expected return associated with it. Faced with this multiplicity
of choices, the attorney is likely to exert more than minimum effort in high stakes
cases. However, he is unlikely to choose the effort level that is optimal for his cli-
ent. Instead he chooses the effort level for which the marginal expected benefit
from additional effort equals his reservation wage. If this description sounds fa-
miliar, it should. It is simply a description of the utility-maximization model using
agency theoretic language.8
The client's inability to limit the number of effort options and, more im-
portantly, to control the difference between attorney returns for different outcomes
provides the attorney with too much control over effort choices. Instead of facing
the possibility of a substantially larger expected return for greater effort, the attor-
ney can choose to work a little harder and receive a slightly greater expected return.
Although the selected effort level is almost certainly greater than what he would
choose in a low-stakes case, it is unlikely to approach the level that is optimal for
the client. Thus, contingent fee contracting is incapable of aligning attorney-client
interests due to the inability of clients to enter into optimal incentive contracts with
their attorneys.
III. PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SCRUTINY AND ESCALATION
A. Case Visibility and Incentives to Work Hard
Although the agency relationship alone cannot induce attorneys to work
hard, the contract combined with public scrutiny or high case visibility may induce
56 Professors Hay's analysis and simulations suggest that client return as a percentage of the maxi-
mum possible return increases with the attorney profit See Hay, supra note 17, at 520. This result is consis-
tent with a conclusion that attorneys work harder when the potential reward is greater which generally occurs
in cases with larger stakes.
57 See supra text accompanying note 44.
58 See supra Part II.A.
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attorneys to work hard. Direct monitoring as contemplated by agency theory is just
as difficult in high-stakes cases as it is in low-stakes cases. However, with greater
stakes, the quality of attorney representation is substantially more visible. For suffi-
ciently high-stakes cases, the media may cover the trial on a regular or even daily
basis.59 The quality of the case presented may be analyzed, and the trial outcome
reported and dissected. Attorneys on both sides may be compared and contrasted,
and have their representation evaluated?60 Even without intensive media coverage,
the attorney's actions are likely to receive greater scrutiny in high-stakes cases.
Clients in such cases are likely to be more sophisticated or have access to advisers
who can monitor attorney representation. Corporate clients have increasingly taken
a more active role in monitoring attorney actions.61 Even in the absence of media
attention and sophisticated clients, peer scrutiny from other attorneys may discour-
age attorneys from shirking in high-stakes cases. Thus, reputation building and
embarrassment avoidance are likely to motivate attorneys where purely economic
factors do not.
Public scrutiny or high case visibility is likely to induce hard work 1) by
enhancing the reputation of attorneys who work hard and 2) embarrassing those
who shirk or obtain poor results. Maintaining a reputation for working in clients'
interests motivates attorneys because failing to do so may make it difficult to obtain
subsequent cases with high expected returns. 62 To compete effectively for such
cases, an attorney must establish a reputation for providing high quality representa-
tion. Shirking in his representation in even one high profile case may be sufficient
to disqualify the attorney from competing for choice cases in the future.0 There-
59 In an earlier period, the trial of Bruno Hauptman for kidnapping the baby of aviator hero Charles
Lindbergh received worldwide media attention, which some believe may have biased the outcome of trial.
See Moses, supra note 13, at 1817-1818.
60 The following quote describes the fishbowl effect of media scrutiny focused on attorneys in high
profile cases:
I suggest that we need to use common sense about how the media pressure tends logically
to affect the different players and necessarily the outcome in high profile cases. The law-
yers involved cannot help but in some fashion be affected by the attention. One does not
get a call from network anchor people every day; it is a once in a lifetime experience.
Many lawyers will naturally conclude his career could be made, depending upon how the
press is handled and the outcome of the case.
Weaver, supra note 13, at 57.
61 Corporate clients are more likely to employ outside counsel on an hourly fee basis. Normally, in-
house corporate counsel is expected to monitor the efforts of outside counsel. In cases of serious doubt, out-
side legal auditors may be called in to take apart billing records and evaluate the propriety of charges. Note,
however, that these monitors pose their own sort of agency problems: the corporate counsel probably has a
bias toward winning, as opposed to losing, even at great cost, and the outside legal auditor undoubtedly works
by the hour. See Stephen Salop & Robert Litan, Reforming the Lawyer-Client Relationship Through Alterna-
tive Billing Methods, 77 JUDICATURE 191, 192-93 (1994) (monitoring problems).
62 See Miller, supra note 17, at 210; Weaver, supra note 13, at 57.
63 Like investing in education, reputation building is economically rational because it enhances the
human capital of the reputation holder, which in turn can increase the holder's income. See COOTER & ULEN,
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fore, having a reputation as a provider of high quality legal representation provides
a self-enforcing mechanism against shirking in high-stakes cases.
In order to maintain this reputation an attorney may overinvest in litigation
by devoting more resources than is justified under short-run utility maximization.4
Whereas the apparent return from investing these resources may not exceed their
costs, the willingness of an attorney to "burn" money signals potential clients that
the attorney is willing to go all out on behalf of clients.s Thus, an attorney in a
high stakes case may be willing to invest an additional $1000 even though the in-
crease in expected return is less than $1000 if the investment shows his devotion to
the case. This behavior is especially likely to occur in a case in which the attorney's
share is measured in the tens or hundreds of thousand dollars.
B. Escalating Commitment and Contingent Fee Attorney Behavior
In addition to promoting the economically rational behavior of reputation
building, public scrutiny in high-stakes cases increases the likelihood that attorneys
become entrapped by escalating commitment. Escalating commitment is the ten-
dency for individuals to make increasing investments in a failing or risky course of
action.66 While there are many factors that promote escalation, psychologists have
discovered that individuals subject to scrutiny are prone to escalate their commit-
ment in order to avoid appearing foolish, incompetent or wrong.67 Attorneys make
many decisions that can be second-guessed. Rejecting a settlement offer, making a
high demand, or choosing a high-risk strategy are examples. If the decision is not
immediately validated, external scrutiny can pressure the attorney to take "face-
saving" actions like refusing to settle or maintaining a high demand.6a If an attor-
supra note 6.
64 See supra note 39.
6 In information economics, the expenditure of excess resources may be a signal to prospective
clients that the attorney will provide high quality representation. The logic is that a shirking attorney would
not invest so much in a case. Therefore, because this attorney in fact did invest an excessive amount in the
case, he cannot be a shirking attorney. For a discussion of signaling models, see KREPS, supra note 44, at
629-638.
66 See Joel Brockner et aL., The Role of Modeling Processes in the Knee Deep in the Big Muddy'
Phenomenon, 33 ORG. BEHAV. & Hutr. PaRF. 77 (1984).
67 Bert R. Brown, The Effects of Need to Maintain Face on Interpersonal Bargaining, 4 J. ExP. Soc.
PSYCHOL. 107 (1968) (noting that in laboratory experiments, observing audiences induce bargainers to will-
ingly incur financial losses in order to retaliate against individuals who had previously made the bargainers
appear foolish).
6 My primary interest is how being observed by others promotes escalating in contingent fee attor-
neys. Although attorneys for both plaintiff and defendants can escalate their commitment, the contingent fee
attorney generally has a greater psychological investment in a case than the attorney for the defendant. Unlike
the defendant's attorney, the contingent fee attorney accepts and files the lawsuit after evaluating the viability
of the plaintiff's claim. Therefore, the attorney's judgment is in question if the case is unsuccessfl or
meritless. Hence, the plaintiff's attorney has the incentive to validate his prior decision by winning or obtain-
ing a significant settlement. In addition, the contingent fee attorney has an ever-increasing financial invest-
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ney succumbs to these pressures, escalation and entrapment often provide a better
explanation for his decisions and choices than does his legal training or experience.
The need to validate decisions and investments has been repeatedly ob-
served. In studies of escalation, subjects are often entrapped in games of escalating
commitment and investment. Often the dynamic is so strong that subjects continue
investing in the game long after one or both subjects have lost money and have no
possibility of breaking even.69 Professor Shubik devised a fiendishly clever game
called the dollar auction that illustrates this dynamic.70 The game administrator
announces that he will auction a dollar bill to the highest bidder. All bidding is
public, anyone can bid, and there is no limit to the number of bids that one person
can make. Bidders can quit bidding at any time. The game deviates from a standard
auction in that both the highest bidder and the second highest bidder pay their final
bids, but only the highest bidder receives the dollar. Hence, if the final bids are $.55
and $.60, the highest bidder nets $.40 and the second highest bidder loses $.45.
Bidding, however, almost always exceeds the one dollar level. When bids
reach the one dollar mark, students realize that if they quit, not only do they lose a
dollar by finishing second, but they also feel extremely foolish because they were
"suckered" into participating in this game. However, if they continue and the other
side quits, they lose far less than one dollar and they save face by "winning" the
game. Unfortunately, the other side has the same incentives. At every bid level, the
pressure to continue in the game is intense. Increasing your bid almost always ap-
pears to result in a smaller loss than finishing second with your current bid. In ad-
dition, there is the validation of winning versus losing the game. Thus, a $1.90 bid-
der stands to lose nearly two dollars by finishing second, whereas increasing to a
winning bid of $2.10 reduces the loss to $1.10. Although the bidder likely realizes
that the other side has an incentive to increase her bid from $2.00 to $2.20, the bid
increase allows the student to delay admitting defeat, and provides a possibility of
victory. In my classes, subjects have spent over six dollars for the one-dollar
71prize.
Escalating commitment fails to satisfy basic economic rationality require-
ments. Rationality requires individuals to exclude consideration of prior invest-
ments and expenses from their decisions because these (sunk) costs are irrelevant to
ment in the case because he bears litigation costs. See Robert H. Gertner & Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement
Escrows, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 87, 98 (1995). Thus, the contingent fee attorney may psychologically need to
validate both his decision to take the case and his financial investment in the case.
69 See ALLAN I. TEGEP, Too MUCH INVESTED TO QUIT 12-25 (1980); see generally WILLIAM
POUNDSTONE, PRISONER'S DILEMMA (1992).
70 Martin Shubik, The Dollar Auction Game: A Paradox in Noncooperative Behavior and Escala-
tion, 15 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 109, 109-11 (1971).
71 I have conducted this game several times in classes with final bids typically in the $2-$3 range.
Bids typically start in the $.20-$.30 range, and bidders do not realize that they have been trapped until bids
exceed the one dollar mark. For a description of the game that ended with a six-dollar bid, see infra note 178.
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current and future decisions.7 2 Therefore, if the most beneficial action from this
moment forward is to terminate the previous course of action, a rational actor will
do so whether he had spent zero, one, or one million dollars. The sunk costs would
not be a consideration in selecting the proper course of action. Thus, a rational in-
dividual would never fall into the endless spiral of never-ending investments in a
hopeless game of entrapment like the dollar auction. However, individuals do take
prior expenditures into account in making prospective decisions. If those prior de-
cisions can make the individual look foolish or incompetent, he is likely to take
actions to rationalize such prior decisions.73
The dollar auction is not the only circumstance in which prospective deci-
sions depend on prior investments. Individuals consistently rely on sunk costs in
making decisions 4 Some examples include waiting on hold for a caller when you
have better things to do with your time,7" waiting for a bus to come when you could
have walked the distance in a shorter time,7 6 and the U.S. military engagement in
Southeast Asia.7 What drives us in these examples is a need to validate our in-
vestments. Recognizing that our costs are sunk, or lost, is an admission that previ-
72 In describing the appropriate treatment of sunk costs, one commentator stressed that certain costs
"are 'sunk and rational, risk-neutral, bidders will not count them in formulating their bidding strategies. Since
those costs can never be regained, the whole vantage point shifts to the return on each new dollar expended."
Bruce A. Markell, The Case Against Breakup Fees In Bankruptcy, 66 AM. BANK. LJ 349 n.61 (1992). See
also, Kenneth R. French & Robert E. McCormick, Sealed Bids, Sunk Costs, and the Process of Competition,
57 J. Bus. 417,424 (1984); James R. Holcomb & Doria Evans, The Effect of Sunk Costs on Uncertain Deci-
sions in Experimental Markets, 16 J. BEHAvIORAL EcON. 59 (Fall, 1987); Owen Phillips, et al., Sunk and
Opportunity Costs in Valuation and Bidding, 58 So. ECON. J. 112, 112 n. 1 (1991).
73 See Brockner, supra note 8, at 40-41; Staw, supra note 8, at 28-29.
74 See generally Max I. Bazerman & F. D. Schoorman, Performance Evaluation in Dynamic Con-
text: The Impact of a Prior Commitment to the Ratee, 67 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 873 (1982); M. Davis & P Bo-
bko, Contextual Effects on Escalation Processes in Public Sector Decision Making, 37 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM.
DEC PRocEssEs 121 (1986); Frederick V. Fox & Barry M. Staw, The TrappedAdministrator: Effects of Job
Insecurity and Policy Resistance Upon Commitment to a Course of Action, 24 ADMIN. SC. Q. 449 (1979);
Staw, supra note 8; M. . Strube & C. L Lott, Tme Urgency and the Type A Behavior Pattern: Implications
for Time Investment and the Psychological Entrapment, 18 J. REs. IN PERSONALrrY 395 (1984).
75 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
76 See BROCKNER & RUBIN, supra note 8, at 1.
77 Professor Staw believes that the United States long involvement in Vietnam was due to escalation
behavior. The investment in the war produced negative results for which two presidents felt a need to ration-
alize with additional investments of manpower and other resources. Professor Staw uses the following pas-
sage from a memo from Undersecretary of State George Ball to President Johnson early in the conflict to
underscore his point:
Once large numbers of U.S. troops are committed to direct combat, they will begin to
take heavy casualties in a war they are ill-equipped to fight in a non-cooperative if not
downright hostile countryside. Once we suffer large casualties, we will have started a
well-nigh irreversible process. Our involvement will be so great that we cannot - without
national humiliation- stop short of achieving our complete objectives. Of the two possi-
bilities, I think humiliation would be more likely than the achievementof our objectives-
even after we have paid terrible costs.
Staw, supra note 8, at 29.
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ous investments were a waste, in essence, a poor choice. Therefore, the individual
must admit that he made a bad decision. It is often easier to invest more in hope of
validating the previous decision than to admit failure. Hence, when on hold or
waiting for a bus, the individual may choose to wait a little longer rather than admit
that he made an incorrect decision. Unfortunately, the longer he waits, the harder it
is to admit that the time was wasted. We tend to feel even more foolish for invest-
ing even more time in the fruitless activity. Thus, we become even further en-
trapped with each additional investment of resources.
Researchers generally agree that an important contributor to escalating
commitment is self-justification.78 When an individual (or group) has invested sig-
nificant resources in an endeavor, it is difficult for that decision-maker to admit that
the course of action was in vain and should not be continued. In order to justify or
validate the correctness of the action, the decision-maker continues on the course,
investing even more resources in the (often) futile enterprise. The insidious trap
grows with each additional investment because the growing investment requires
even greater justification. Often, even if the decision-maker achieves the desired
outcome, the cost of achieving the goal exceeds the costs of alternative actions.
Thus, a traveler will find that if he waits long enough for a bus to come, it will in
fact arrive. However, walking instead of waiting would have gotten him to his des-
tination in a shorter time.
Contingent fee attorneys are subject to escalating commitment. The attor-
ney faces a multitude of decision nodes that provide him with an opportunity to
stop investing in the case. Initially, he can refuse to take the case, or after taking the
case he can pursue an early settlement. If these negotiations fail, the attorney can
drop the case with his client's consent or attempt to settle pre-trial. Each time the
case progresses past a decision node, the attorney's investment in time, labor and
money mount. As expenditures mount, the litigator's decision to terminate the case
becomes increasingly difficult. Prior investments make it increasingly difficult for
the attorney to accept a settlement that was available at a prior decision node when
total investments were lower. Accepting the settlement becomes a tacit admission
that the intervening investments were wasted. Thus, the attorney may find it cogni-
tively easier to hold out for a better outcome rather than admit the stupidity of his
prior decision to continue.79 The entrapped attorney becomes the addicted gambler
78 Other explanations include prospect theory, under which behavior depends on how a decision is
framed, see Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decisions Under Risk 47
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979), and decision dilemma theory, under which escalation occurs because decision-
makers have not received truly negative feedback about their choices see M. G. Bowen, The Escalation
Phenomenon Reconsidered: Decision Dilemmas or Decision Errors, 12 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 12 (1987).
Professor Brockner considers these alternative theories and finds flaws in their arguments. See Brockner,
supra note 8, at 50-53.
79 Settlement becomes hard but not impossible. Sometimes an approaching trial, a judge's threat or
the removal of an active combatant act as a catalyst to break a stalement. Such actions allow parties to settle
or end hostilities while saving face. See, e.g., Will McDonough, Finally, NFL makes a deal, BOSTON GLOBE,
January 7, 1993, (Sports), at 37 (describing how judge's threat facilitated settlement over free-agency based
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who after blowing half of his life savings at the blackjack table, continues to play
because winning a jackpot is the only way to prove that his prior actions were wise
rather than a blunder. Similarly the litigator refuses to settle because winning or
obtaining a substantially larger settlement is the only way to avoid admitting that
his prior decisions were unwise. Hence, with the passage of time, the ability of an
attorney to terminate litigation is countered by a growing pile of investments that
he psychologically has to justify.
C. Escalation Explanations
Researchers have identified several factors that influence a decision-
maker's susceptibility to escalating commitment. These factors include the use of
models, the nature of the opponent, and face saving.80 A decision-maker is often
uncertain about whether it is better to cut his losses immediately or persist with the
hope of achieving his goal. When faced with this dilemma, for guidance, a deci-
sion-maker sometimes looks at how others have handled similar problems. For
example, in deciding on whether to continue repairing an old car, a consumer may
rely heavily on whether a friend or neighbor with a similar car continues to repair
his vehicle.81 Or a company with a product line that loses money may continue to
market the product line if it observes its competitor marketing a similar product
line. The company may be unwilling to terminate the product line while a com-
petitor continues marketing their line. If the competing company eventually turns
its struggling product line into a profitable one, the company that terminated its line
prematurely may be unable to justify its prior decision. Alternatively, if the com-
petitor terminates its product line, the decision to terminate for the company facing
the dilemma is easier. Hence, decision-makers may become more entrapped when
their models are also entrapped.82
Opponent characteristics also influence an individual's susceptibility to es-
calating commitment. A decision-maker is more inclined to compete against an
opponent who escalates a conflict or an opponent who the decision-maker per-
ceives to be dissimilar. In Professor Teger's studies conducted during the 1970s, a
salient measure of difference was how a student ranked on the "freak-jock" dimen-
lawsuits); Rifka Rosenwein, Milton Pollack Becomes Drexe'r Hero, MANHATrAN LAW, April, 1991, at 1;
(reporting how Judge Milton Pollack's threat and deadline prompted stalemated lawyers to fashion a settle-
ment in the massive Drexel Burhnam Lambert Inc. bankruptcy); Asbestos: Lawyers' Delight, THE
ECONOMIST, September 3, 1988, at 23 (reporting that the pressure of an impending trial has prompted settle-
ments in excess of $800,000 in asbestos litigation against the Manville Corporation). See also infra, notes 88-
90 and accompanying text (describing how the Texaco-Penzoil dispute was not finally resolved until after
replacement of the Texaco board chairman).
so ,See BROCKNER & RUBIN, supra note 8, at 101.
81 See id at 75.
82 See ia
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sion.'3 Students with long-hair, and faded jeans were stereotypically associated
with the drug culture of the time. By contrast, conservatively dressed students with
short hair were stereotypically associated with the jock group because athletes of
that era generally conformed to that style of dress. Teger found that freaks and
jocks escalated their commitment to a greater extent when their opponents had ap-
pearances that conformed to the stereotype for the other end of the spectrum.84
Face saving, in particular, can escalate a decision-maker's need to justify
his actions. Many sociologists believe that most social behavior is motivated by the
desire to look good in the eyes of those whose opinion we respect and hold in high
regard. This drive to look good or maintain face is evident in escalation situations.
A decision-maker's need to justify his actions is heightened when others are ob-
serving his behavior. Individuals are extremely concerned about being embarrassed
or humiliated in public and will often go to great lengths to retaliate for a slight.e8
One of the most tragic examples of this face saving phenomenon was the U.S. in-
volvement in Indochina. Commentators believe that during the Vietnam War era
the need to avoid the humiliation and embarrassment of admitting that U.S. in-
volvement in Vietnam was a mistake was so great that it drove U.S. foreign policy
to continue in the war.87 At the time, U.S. leadership was concerned both with ad-
mitting a mistake to the rest of the world and to a U.S. populace that was sharply
divided between supporting and opposing the war. Admitting that the war was a
mistake would validate the beliefs of antiwar activists and would disenchant sup-
porters of the war. The humiliation of giving in to the opposition and letting down
supporters may have been such a distasteful alternative that none of the three pre-
siding U.S. presidents were willing to end U.S. military operations in Indochina.88
There are examples of face-saving-fed escalations that have dynamics
closely related to the behavioral dynamics in high-stakes litigation. Brockner and
Rubin provide an example of a labor dispute in which the respective leaders of the
two sides felt pressured by their constituencies to press for yet greater concessions
the longer the strike lasted.89 As losses mounted on both sides, leaders of each side
increasingly believed that they had to produce a concrete gain in order to justify
their constituencies' sacrifices. The Texaco and Pennzoil settlement negotiation
provides an additional example. After losing the biggest court judgment ever in the
83 See TEGER, supra note 69, at 79.
84 See id.
85 See, e.g., E. GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EvERYDAY LIFE (1959); N. Snyder, Im-
pression Management: The Self in SOCIAL INTERACTION IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN THE 80s (L. Wrights-
man& Kay Deaux eds., 1981).
86 See Brown, supra note 67.
87 See supra note 77.
88 0
See BROCKNER & RUBIN, supra note 8, at 102.
89 ,
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U.S.,s° the Texaco board had tremendous difficulty settling the case. Settling the
case at the time would have been a tacit admission to stockholders that the board
had erred in failing to settle the case prior to trial."' The board settled only after
seeking Chapter 11 protection and being pressured by a shareholder committee."
Both of these illustrations exemplify contentious adversarial disputes. In each case
the stakes were high, and interactions occurred in the spotlight of public and con-
stituency attention. These same characteristics are often present in high-stakes liti-
gation as well.
D. Critical or Evaluative Scrutiny and Escalating Commitment
Laboratory research has shown that performance under scrutiny can exac-
erbate escalating commitment. By manipulating the number of observers, the ac-
countability, and support for the decision-maker, researchers have gained a signifi-
cant understanding of this dynamic. In general the number of observers has little
effect. Instead a key variable is whether observers are in evaluative positions. In a
study examining these issues, researchers manipulated the number of individuals
observing subject behavior."e Under one condition the experimenter was the sole
observer.94 Under an alternative condition, the experimenter informed subjects that
two graduate students with an interest in the research study would observe their
actions. These graduate students would attend the sessions under this condition and
would be visible but would have no other role in the study. The researchers found
that subjects did not alter their decisions significantly when observers were
present.95 Their result supports the proposition that mere observation without
judgment power has limited effect on escalating commitment.
Other research has defined the connection more precisely. Fox and Staw
employed a different methodology to investigate the role of scrutiny on escalating
commitment.' Instead of using actual observers, the researchers created a scenario
under which the degree of scrutiny varied. Specifically, the experimenter informed
90 See generally Texaco, Inc. v. Penzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (rex. Ct. App. 1987).
91 One report suggested that the Texaco board believed that it would be liable whether or not it
settled with Penzoil. Therefore, with nothing to lose, the board opted to pursue an appeal of the judgment,
which would have absolved the board of liability and blame. See Matthew L Wald, Clause in Texaco Pact Is
Questioned, N.Y. TIMES, March 1, 1988, atD2.
92 Jim Kinnear is Pumping New Life Into Texaco, BUSINESS WEEK, April 17, 1989 at 50.
93 See BROCKNER & RUBIN, supra note 8, at 104-105.
94 A condition in a control experiment is a situation in which the experimenter holds the relevant
variables constant. The experiment consists of multiple conditions. The experimenter allows one key variable
to change between conditions. Thus, by comparing the results from multiple conditions in which a single
variable changes, the experimenter can identify the effect of that variable.
95 See BROCKNER & RUBIN, supra note 8, at 104-105.
96 See Fox & Staw, supra note 74.
23
Thomas: Psychological Impact of Scrutiny on Contingent Fee Attorney Effor
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1998
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
each subject that he was an administrator in a company who had just been ap-
pointed to the position of vice president of finance. The subject then made a deci-
sion about which of two company divisions to give $10 million in funding. The
subjects justified their decision in writing and then received written feedback about
the decision.
Behavior varied based on the degree of security and support the subject
enjoyed. In what the researchers described as the high insecurity condition, instruc-
tions informed each subject that his appointment was temporary and that his con-
tinuation in- the vice president slot depended on the success of his recommendation.
Moreover, he enjoyed little support from envious peers who would enjoy seeing
him fail. Alternatively, instructions in the low insecurity condition informed the
subject that his appointment was permanent and independent of his current deci-
sion. The instructions informed the subject that he enjoyed strong support from his
peers and that the support would remain strong even if his recommendation fared
poorly.97 Hence, the subject had far more to lose under the high insecurity condi-
tion. The researchers found that there was a close connection between highly scru-
tinized performance and reward in this condition. The connection was far more
attenuated in the low insecurity condition. As expected, subjects escalated their
investments to a significantly greater extent in the high insecurity condition." The
presence of evaluative and highly critical scrutiny contributed far more to escalat-
ing commitment than a less threatening, less critical environment.
Litigation, especially high-stakes litigation, shares many of the character-
istics that researchers identify as contributing to escalating commitment. Litigation
is highly competitive. However, competition alone is not always sufficient to in-
duce face-saving behavior. In addition to being highly competitive, high-stakes
cases levy a high degree of evaluative scrutiny on participating attorneys. Evalua-
tive scrutiny is likely to come from sophisticated clients, media coverage, peers, or
some combination of the three.99 The attorney's role is likely to resemble Fox and
97 Fox and Staw also tested a resistance condition in which they manipulated the board of director's
support for the subject's funding decision. Under the high resistance condition, the board is very critical of
the subject's decision and reluctantly defers to the subject's choice. In the alternative, low resistance condi-
tion, the board views the decision very favorably and tenders the subject high support. Hence, under the high
resistance condition the subject is all alone in his decision. If the recommendation falls, it is all his fault and
only he loses face. In the low resistance condition the board's support ameliorates the sting of failure. There-
fore, if the project fails the subject's loss of face is not as great because he has the board's support Thus,
theoretically, because the loss of face is greatest under the high resistance condition, subjects should exhibit
greater escalation behavior under this condition than under the low resistance condition. Fox and Staw's
results support this hypothesis. See id. at 454.
98 See id. at 462-463.
99 If a large corporation is involved in a significantly litigated matter, it usually employs in-house
counsel to monitor the efforts of its trial counsel. See supra note 61 (discussing the ability of in-house counsel
to effectively monitor outside trial counsel). Media scrutiny and the use of attorney commentators has gener-
ated much concern over the impact of the media )n litigation. See, e.g., Proposal to Ban Cameras and Pre-
Trial Stage, S.F. CHRONICLE, February 24, 1996, at C1 (covering a California government response to the
belief that televised media coverage influences the behavior of trial participants); James E. Lukaszewski, The
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Staw's high insecurity condition. Whereas the client may be supportive, especially
if there is a continuing relationship, it is unlikely that the attorney or his law firm
will devote their entire practice to a single client. Therefore, the attorney in a high-
visibility, high-stakes cases is in a constant high insecurity state because future
business and employment depends on how well others evaluate his performance in
each case. If evaluators rate the attorney's performance high, then the attorney is
likely to be considered for future high-stakes cases. If, however, evaluators rate the
attorney's performance poor, then the attorney is unlikely to be considered for other
high-stakes cases. 00 Hence, the attorney's continued livelihood, in terms of pres-
tige and income level, is likely to depend on how others evaluate his
performance. 1 '
Adding to the escalation pressure in high-stakes cases is the objectivity of
evaluators. Fox and Staw call this measure resistance. The variable measures the
degree of support that evaluators have for the attorney's decision choices."0 If
evaluators support the decision as proper and wise, the attorney feels less pressure
to prove the correctness of his choice. If evaluators instead have misgivings or sec-
ond-guess the attorney's decision, then the attorney feels pressure to save face by
proving his detractors wrong. The client in low-to-moderate stakes cases may not
provide resistance to the attorney's decision. If the attorney has a continuing and
successful relationship with his client, the client may defer to the attorney's judg-
ment. Even in the absence of a relationship, the expertise imbalance may leave an
unsophisticated client with little choice but to accept the attorney's decisions with
Other Prosecutors; Media Scrutiny of Corporate Troubles, 42 PUB. REL. QUART. 23 (March 22, 1997) (com-
paring the media treatment of a company with legal problems to that of a prosecutor); Moses, supra note 13,
at 1815 n.14 (1995) (quoting the ABA president's categorization of the growing numbers of attorneys who
become television commentators on high profile cases as, "S2 hookers"). Although most civil cases do not
receive television and daly scrutiny, scrutiny does increase with the notoriety of the parties, the subject
matter or the amount in question.
100 An attorney's poor reputation almost guarantees that he will have substantial trouble maintaining a
viable practice. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, The Role of Lawyers in Positive Theories of Doctrinal Evolution, 45
EMORY LJ. 523, 533 n.34 (1996) (noting that a lawyer with a good reputation is more successful than a
lawyer without a good reputation); Eduardo J. Benitez et al., Telecommunication Reforms in the Americas:
New Legislation and the Regulatory Framework, 13 Am. U. INT'L L. REv. 971, 984 (1998) ("[Y]ou will be
known as a deal killer [if your legal counsel is overly cautious].... If you have the reputation of being a deal
killer, you will never work again"). In addition, it is important for the attorney to maintain an excellent repu-
tation with the bench especially if he appears before a court on an ongoing basis. For example:
[I]n bankruptcy cases the reputation of an attorney, especially an attorney who regularly
represents Debtors, is perhaps the most valuable asset that the lawyer owns. If a court be-
lieves that an attorney has failed to act properly in regard to his fiduciary duties as Estate
Counsel, that belief will make the attorney's future bankruptcy practice that much more
difficult.
C.R. Bowles, Jr. & Nancy B. Rapoport, Has the Dip's Attorney Become the Ultimate Creditors' Lawyer in
Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases?, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 47,73 (1997)(emphasis added).
101 See Miller, supra note 17, at 210.
102 See supra note 95.
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little evaluative feedback. 33
The attorney's peers and the media are likely to be less accepting of sus-
pect legal decisions. Peers with significant legal knowledge are likely to be far less
forgiving in evaluating the attorney's choices. Viewed from the vantage of "what I
would do" in the situation, peer attorneys are likely to be quite critical of any per-
ceived miscues. This criticism is likely to be amplified in the press as legal report-
ers and consultants second guess attorney decisions. As the stakes and public inter-
est in the case increase, the evaluative pressure is likely to increase as well.1 04
Hence, the level of escalation-induced work should be substantially greater in
highly scrutinized high-stakes cases.
IV. EMPIRICAL SUPPORT
As a preliminary test of the theory, I designed and conducted a computer-
based laboratory experiment using student subjects. The objective of the experi-
ment was to find out whether the presence of scrutiny induces subjects to increase
their investments in simulated lawsuits. I first discuss the use of experimental
methods in law and economics research. It is particularly efficacious in situations
such as this, where the investigated phenomena is independent of the subjects' legal
knowledge.
A. Use of Experimental Methods in Law and Social Science Research
The use of experiments to illuminate litigant decision-making, although
not yet commonplace, is not unprecedented. Coursey and Stanley used experimen-
tal methods to examine the impact of cost-shifting rules on settlement decisions.
10 5
In a subsequent study Stanley and Coursey used a controlled experiment to exam-
ine certain characteristics of Priest and Klein's selection hypothesis 0 6 This hy-
pothesis posits that trial cases are disproportionately chosen from cases in which
the two sides have strongly divergent beliefs about the probable outcome of trial.
One implication of this hypothesis is that when the two sides are extremely well
prepared, the only cases that go to trial are ones in which the plaintiff has a .5 prob-
ability of winning (the 50 percent rule). 10 7 I also contributed to the trial selection
103 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
104 See supra notes 97-98.
105 See Don L. Coursey & Linda R. Stanley, Pretrial Bargaining Behavior within the Shadow of the
Law: Theory and Experimental Evidence, 8 INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 161 (1988).
106 Linda R. Stanley & Don L. Coursey, Empirical Evidence on the Selection Hypothesis and the
Decision to Litigate or Settle, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 145 (1990).
107 See Priest & Klein, supra note 47. The selection hypothesis is often, incorrectly, considered to be
synonymous with the 50% rule. I argued, however, that the selection hypothesis has significant explanatory
power independent of the .5 implication. See Robert E. Thomas, The Trial Selection Hypothesis Without the
[Vol. 101:327
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literature by examining the effects of information and estimation precision on the
selection hypothesis.l'o
Microeconomists have recognized the value of experimental studies to
augment traditional economic research. The experimental law and economics
studies described above draw on the pioneering efforts of economists Charlie Plott,
Vernon Smith and others.1"° These researchers have found that carefully controlled
experimental studies provide insights that are not available using traditional em-
pirical techniques. The two areas where experimental work is especially efficacious
are situations for which there are 1) lots of highly correlated information, or 2)
missing or unobtainable variables. In litigation both situations are present. It is im-
possible to determine what an attorney would have done had his work been highly
scrutinized, or if the stakes were different. Often settlement rates and amounts are
essential variables required to understand the observed phenomenon. However,
settlement information is rarely available. 110 Moreover, the effects of such factors
may be obscured by the nature of the case. An attorney may work harder if he be-
lieves the case has groundbreaking implications or if he has a positive relationship
with his client. Thus, identifying the effects of scrutiny and case value (the stakes)
is virtually impossible using data from actual cases. The use of controlled experi-
ments allows researchers to isolate the effects of investigated variables from the
effects of other variables.
In the physical sciences and medicine, researchers are often interested in
how outcomes change when initial conditions are altered. These different condi-
tions can include giving patients different dosages of a pharmaceutical product, or
comparing the behaviors of sleep-deprived subjects with the behaviors of subjects
with normal sleep patterns. Under such carefully controlled settings, differences in
health or behavior across test groups can be reliably attributed to the effect of an
investigated variable. In empirical studies that rely on non-experimental data
sources, it is rarely possible to obtain data that cleanly isolates investigated vari-
ables. Sometimes desired conditions do not exist or it may be illegal to produce
such conditions.1 Therefore, in order to obtain a valid understanding of different
50 Percent Rule: Some Experimental Evidence, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 209 (1995).
108 See Thomas, supra note 107.
109 See, e.g., Charles R. Plott & Vernon L Smith, An Experimental Examination of Two Exchange
Institutions, 45 REV. ECON. STUD. 133 (1978); Robert Forsythe et al., An Experimental Analysis of Strikes in
Bargaining Games with One-Sided Private Information, 81 AMER. ECON. REV. 1426 (1991); Jack Ochs &
Alvin E. Roth, An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining, 79 AmER. ECON. REv. 355 (1989).
110 See Stanley & Coursey, supra note 106, at 146.
III Studies of cost-shifting rules are difficult to conduct because the English rule is rarely employed in
the United States. Even when the English rule has been used, judges often tainted it by refusing to enforce it
in its pure state. See Edward A. Snyder & James W. Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal'Costs:
Evidence Confronts Theory, 6 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 345 (1990). The effect of attorney ownership of cases also
cannot be observed through secondary sources due to prohibitions against, "(1) rules against alienation of
choses in action, (2) rules against maintenance or champerty, or (3) state disciplinary provisions against
acquisition by attorneys of a financial interest in litigation." Miller, supra note 17, at 197 (footnotes omitted).
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conditions, or in our case, the behavioral effects of different fee arrangements, ex-
perimental methods provide the only real option. The research question considered
here is particularly amenable to analysis using experimental methods. In order to
measure the impact of critical scrutiny, it is necessary to compare attorney deci-
sions under scrutiny with attorney decisions made in the absence of scrutiny. While
such comparisons are virtually impossible in practice, researchers can easily make
such comparisons in the laboratory.
B. Issues With Experimental Research
Experimental methods, however, are imperfect and subject to criticism.
Two of the most common criticisms of experimental methods are artificiality and
nongeneralizability. 12 The artificiality criticism amounts to a complaint that the
experiment lacks realism. To address this criticism, one must first understand that
there are multiple types of realism. Aronson and Carlsmith suggest that experi-
ments have both experimental and mundane realism. 13 An experiment is realistic
in the former sense if subjects "buy into" the design, take it seriously, and react to
the provided stimuli. An experiment exhibits mundane realism if the experiment
closely resembles the environment it models in the real world. 14 Often the artifici-
ality criticism amounts to a criticism that the experiment lacks mundane realism.
Yet Aronson and his colleagues argue that an experiment that is low in mundane
realism may still be valid provided it is high in experimental realism. 115 By contrast
an experiment that is high in mundane realism may be low in experimental realism
if the experiment is boring, does not hold subjects' interests, or does not provide an
adequate stimulus. 116 Hence, a low level or absence of mundane realism is not nec-
essarily a fatal flaw.
The lack of generalizability criticism often focuses on the use of college
students as subjects and low payoffs that subjects receive. There is a question about
whether college students' decisions correspond closely to decisions that an experi-
enced litigator would make in corresponding situations. In support of using college
students, the phenomena examined here do not depend on legal knowledge or abil-
ity. Most people are subject to escalating commitment. Moreover, the tendency to
112 See ELLIOT ARONSON ET. AL., METHODS OF RESEARCH IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 70-82 (2d ed.
1990).
113 See id. at 70.
114 See id.
115 See id. at 72.
116 Professor Aronson and his colleagues raise the example of an experiment that had college students
read newspaper headlines about a candidate running for public office in a distant city and then provide their
reaction to the candidate. Although this experiment rated high in mundane realism, it was low in experimental
realism because few college students are profoundly affected by reading about political candidates in a distant
city. Although this experiment rated high in the mundane realism dimension, it was extremely low in the
experimental realism dimension. Not surprisingly, the data obtained were uninteresting. See id at 71.
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be ensnarled by such psychological pitfalls appears to be independent of experience
or the number of times the individual has previously fallen for the pitfall. 1
7
A recent study supports the conclusion that experience does not help law-
yers avoid psychological factors that diminish their litigation effectiveness. In the
study a group of students and a group of experienced litigators participated in a
controlled experiment.la One of the study's objectives was to determine whether
expected -utility or prospect theory1 9 from psychology is the better predictor of
subject decision choices in a given case. Researchers randomly assigned subjects to
the roles of either plaintiff s or defendant's attorney in a personal injury case. Each
subject received an outline of case details and 100 jury decisions from similar
cases.120 Students in plaintiffs' attorneys roles as well as students and attorneys in
defendants' attorneys roles gave unbiased estimates of the outcome. However, at-
torneys in plaintiff roles were overconfident in their appraisals suggesting that ex-
perience may make people more prone to the psychological bias of
overconfidence.1 2 But of greater interest to this study, the researchers found that
subjects' decisions, whether by attorneys or students, were consistent with the pre-
dictions of prospect theory. Subjects in plaintiff roles exhibited risk aversion
whereas subjects in defendant roles were dsk-seeking.' 2 Both legally astute and
inexperienced subjects failed to realize that their decisions were biased by the posi-
tions in which they were arbitrarily placed. The experiment shows, provided that a
well-designed study does not draw on subjects' legal knowledge, there is unlikely
to be significant differences between students' and litigators' decisions.Experience or training does not imply excellence even in matters that are
highly related to one's field. In a test of learning effects, a researcher evaluated
experienced psychologists' abilities to evaluate the Bender Gestalt test for brain
damage in patients. 2 The Bender Gestalt test requires a patient to duplicate draw-
117 Learning from experience requires accurate and immediate feedback. See Max H. BAZERMAN &
MARGARET A. NEALE, NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY 109 (1992). Professors Tversky and Kahneman suggest
that 1) the separation between outcome and causative action is often too attenuated to make an accurate
attribution, 2) environmental variation degrades the reliability of feedback, 3) it is usually impossible to
project the outcomes of alternative actions, and 4) the uniqueness of most decisions provides little opportu-
nity for learning. Unless all these problems are avoided, Tversky and Kahneman argue, there is little chance
that an actor will avoid repeating the error. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the
Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus. 251, 274 (1986).
118 See Linda Babcock et al., Forming Beliefs About Adjudicated Outcomes: Perceptions of Risk and
Reservation Values, 15 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 289 (1995).
119 Prospect theory posits that a decision-makers risk attitude varies depending on whether he faces a
gain or a loss. Actors facing gains are likely to be risk-averse, whereas actors facing losses are apt to be risk-
seeking. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 78.
120 See Babcock et al., supra note 118, at 292.
121 See id. at 294-295.
122 See id. at 300.
123 Lewis R. Goldberg, The Effectiveness of Clinicians'Judgments: The Diagnostic of Organic Brain
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ings of various overlapping shapes on a piece of paper. The absence of drawing
segments, overlaps, and other imperfections in the drawing provide conclusive
evidence of brain damage. However, interpreting the results can be quite difficult.
The study measured the accuracy of experienced psychologists' evaluations relative
to a group of trainees, and the secretaries of the experienced psychologists.124 The
accuracy rates ranged from 65 percent for the experienced psychologists to 70 per-
cent for their secretaries. 125 These results contrast with the accuracy of a purported
expert in using the Bender Gestalt test who achieved an accuracy rating of 83 per-
cent.126 The dilemma is that it is hard to avoid a problem that one does not know
exists. Despite many years of experience, the psychologists' failure to review con-
sciously and objectively the results of their evaluations resulted in skills that were
indistinguishable from neophytes in their field.
The low payoff criticism is related to experimental realism. If the payoff
incentive is inadequate, then subjects do not take their assigned tasks seriously.
Others reject this criticism on the assumption that the experiment will succeed pro-
vided subjects prefer more to less money.1 27 The amounts used in my experiment,
$7-$64, were large enough to pay for lunch or sometimes dinner at a nice restau-
rant. Hence, the subjects actually had a significant incentive to perform well.1 2 In
addition to this argument, the different conditions or fee arrangements provide a
self-check for the effectiveness of the experimental payoff structure. If the potential
rewards are insufficient, then subject behavior should not differ between conditions
with different payoff structures. Thus, differences in decision making between con-
ditions provide support for the adequacy of the payoff structure.
Damage From the Bender Gestalt Test, 23 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOL. 25 (1959), discussed in J. EDWARD
Russo & PAUL J. SCHOEMAKER, DECISION TRAPS 175 (1989).
124 The experienced psychologists had many years of experience with the test, the trainees averaged
three years, and the secretaries had no training in interpreting test results. See supra note 123.
125 See id.
126 See id. at 176.
127 See Vernon L. Smith, Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory, 66 AM. ECON. REv. 274,
275 (1976). As one researcher stated, "subjects prefer more money to less money in the same way that people
prefer more to less in naturally occurring economic situations - not always, but to an overwhelming degree
and in certain regular, predictable ways. This is enough to make experimental data useful...." Elizabeth
Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Experimental Law and Economics: An Introduction, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
991, 992 n.4 (1985).
128 In the experiment I conducted, the two highest paid subjects received $50.80 and $64.80. Average
and median payments for the experiment were respectively $11.59 and $9.00. For a description of the pay-
ment methodology see infra discussion accompanying note 147.
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C. Design of the Experiment
1. Overview
The experiment presented each subject with the sometimes conflicting
twin objectives of representing a (fictional) client and maximizing the subject's
monetary compensation. Both male and female college students participated in a
series of simulated computer-based lawsuits. In each session, subjects were in-
volved in five simulated lawsuits. In each lawsuit, a certain amount of money,
ranging from $7 to $90 was at stake. The "laboratory" was a computer room con-
taining over twenty networked computers. Five to fifteen subjects participated
during each session. A "master" computer, run by the experimenter, controlled
each of the subject's computers. As a result the experimenter had the ability to
monitor every action that each subject took.
Each subject played the role of plaintiffs attorney against a computer. All
subjects received a $20 endowment to use for each simulated lawsuit. Subjects
prepared for trial by p'urchasing units of evidence at $0.10 or $0.20 per unit. Each
time a subject purchased evidence, the subject's computer deducted the cost of that
purchase from either the subject's endowment or his client's endowment. There
were two types of evidence. P evidence favored plaintiffs and D evidence favored
defendants. For each simulated case, there were 115 units of evidence. The experi-
menter determined the composition of the 115 units before the start of each simula-
tion. For example, the experimenter might select seventy P units and forty-five D
units for a case that favored the plaintiff, and fifty-seven P units and fifty-eight D
units for a close case that favored the defendant.
The act of purchasing units was the proxy for case preparation. Subjects
learned about the composition of evidence by purchasing evidence units. I equated
purchasing units to the subject's willingness to invest in the case. Subjects could
purchase up to five units at a time by selecting the desired number on their com-
puter screen.12 The computer then randomly chose the designated number of units
from the unpurchased evidence and revealed the evidence to the subject. For exam-
ple, suppose the subject purchased five evidence units by selecting the number five.
The computer randomly selected five units from the set of unrevealed evidence
units. The purchased units could contain from zero to five P units. Suppose the five
units consisted of four P and one D units. The computer then revealed this infor-
mation to the subject, the subject's total collected evidence increased by four P and
one D units, respectively, and the subject's endowment decreased by one dollar.
Hence, if prior to this selection the subject had purchased fourteen P and ten D
129 The cost of random purchases was $0.10 per unit. The subject could also purchase "biased" selec-
tions at a price of $0.20 per unit. These purchases purportedly were more likely than random purchases to
select P units of evidence. The purpose of the $0.20 option was to give subjects the ability to exert greater
effort as well as to continue purchasing evidence in cases that favored the defendant. In cases in which most
of the 115 units were of type D, random purchases were highly likely to be overwhelmingly populated with D
units as well. Therefore, the biased selection provided an incentive to continue working in losing cases.
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units, after the selection the subject's computer screen would indicate that he had
collected a total of eighteen P and eleven D units. After this purchase, there would
be 86 unrevealed units of evidence remaining. During each simulation, the subject
could purchase at most 100 units at up to five units a time using this process. The
experiment reserved the remaining fifteen units of evidence (" reserved evidence")
to help determine the case outcome.
The computer awarded cases that did not settle to the party with the most
collected and reserved evidence favoring its side. For example, if the subject col-
lected twenty-two P and eighteen D units, and there were seven P and eight D units
of reserved evidence, the plaintiff won the case twenty-nine to twenty-six. If, how-
ever, there were ten or more D units of evidence reserved, then the subject lost the
case because the twenty-eight or more D units exceeded the at most twenty-seven P
units. The sixty unrevealed units of evidence did not factor in the case outcome.
Hence, subjects could influence the outcome of the case. If the plaintiff purchased
too little evidence, he would lose the case if the reserved evidence favored the de-
fendant. However, if the subject purchased a large number of evidence units, and
most of his purchased evidence were P units, reserved evidence had little effect on
the outcome. Thus, subjects had an incentive to maximize the difference between P
and D evidence they purchased.
In addition to purchasing evidence, subjects could make a settlement re-
quest or end the case by going to trial. Subjects indicated a desire to settle by
pressing a screen button and entering a settlement demand. The computer accepted
this amount if it did not exceed the original ratio of P units to total units of evidence
times the amount at stake. Hence, if $60 was at stake and fifty-eight of the 115
units were of type P, the computer rejected settlements demands that exceeded $30.
Therefore, a subject's unwillingness to make a sufficiently low settlement demand
to end the case could indicate high confidence or possibly escalated commitment. If
the computer rejected a settlement demand, the subject could make a subsequent
demand after purchasing at least one additional unit of evidence. The subject could
make as many or as few settlement demands as he desired. This process continued
until 1) the computer accepted the subject's settlement demand, 2) the computer
decided the case at trial (at the subject's request),'30 or 3) after the lapse of seven
minutes. To encourage settlement, the simulation charged either the subject or cli-
ent a five-dollar "trial tax" if the case ended at trial. This tax also served as a proxy
for the additional costs of trial. Each session lasted approximately ninety minutes
and time was not a constraint. 13' Thus, spending more money purchasing more
130 Subjects indicated a desire to end a simulation by pressing a screen button. To avoid mistakes, the
computer requested two verifications of the trial request before ending a simulated case.
131 Time was only a factor during the first simulation in each session. Subjects quickly became fa-
miliar with the workings of the simulation. By the fifth dispute, the dispute used for data analysis, most
subjects were completing the dispute in five minutes or less. Two subjects, all in the hourly fee group, used
seven minutes in the fifth case of the simulation. I excluded data obtained for these two subjects. Including
the data as either settled or trial cases would not alter the statistical inferences drawn from the study.
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evidence than other subjects was a sign of escalated commitment.
Subject compensation depended on subject decisions and case characteris-
tics. Each session consisted of five simulated lawsuits. The purpose of running five
simulations per session was to allow each subject to become thoroughly familiar
with the simulation software. The simulations varied from cases that strongly fa-
vored the plaintiff to cases that strongly favored the defendant. The final simulation
in each session consisted of cases that were even, favoring neither side. I used data
only from the fifth simulation in each session. I chose these disputes since even
cases are thought to be the most contentious with the highest probability of ending
in trial. 32 The subject's return for each lawsuit equaled the remainder of his en-
dowment plus the subject's share of the case award. Although each subject received
a return for each lawsuit, they received pay for just one lawsuit chosen at random
from the final four simulations in each session.
Dimensions that varied between sessions included the fee arrangement and
the amount at stake. Each subject faced a single fee arrangement-stakes combina-
tion. Tested fee arrangements included hourly, contingent, and an interests-aligned
fee arrangement. Under the hourly fee arrangement, each subject's return increased
with the subject's purchases. Hence, if the subject purchased twenty units of evi-
dence at $0.10 per unit, his endowment increased by two dollars. This return was
independent of the case outcome. If the case went to trial, the subject's return in-
creased by $5 due to the trial tax. The objective of this compensation scheme was
to model the relationship between hourly fee attorney effort and compensation.
Hence, hourly fee subjects' compensation increased with expenditures. The greater
the effort put into a case the greater the compensation.
In the contingent fee and interests-aligned groups, subjects' endowments
decreased with effort expenditures. The same twenty-unit purchase in these cases
reduced the subject's return by two dollars. The return for subjects in contingent
fee simulations equaled the remainder of the subject's endowment plus one-third of
1) the court award (the stakes if victorious and zero otherwise) or 2) the settlement
amount. In either event, the subject was responsible for paying all costs out of his
$20 endowment including, when applicable, the $5 trial tax. Therefore, if the sub-
ject spent $7 purchasing evidence and went to trial thereby incurring the $5 trial
tax, the simulation subtracted $12 from his endowment. The interests-aligned group
differed from the contingent fee groups in that the subject received 100 percent of
the court award or settlement. In effect, the interests-aligned subject was both at-
torney and plaintiff simultaneous. This group provided the baseline comparison for
the other groups.
132 Attorneys in cases that clearly favor one side are less likely to become entrapped because the
futility of continuing is hard to deny. When the case is even (.5 probability of winning), the attorney may be
able to convince himself that fighting rather than settling is the best alternative. See Priest & Klein, supra
note 47. But see Wittman, supra note 47; Donald Wittman, Dispute Resolution, Bargaining and the Selection
ofCasesfor Trial: A Study of the Generation of Biased and Unbiased Data, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 313 (1988).
33
Thomas: Psychological Impact of Scrutiny on Contingent Fee Attorney Effor
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1998
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
2. Experimental Procedure
The subject pool consisted of 342 male and female undergraduate students
from a major research university in the southeastem United States.133 Subjects were
recruited from a large undergraduate, introductory business-management course.
Subjects represented a variety of college majors, and were randomly assigned to
each of the experimental conditions. The compensation method was critical to the
objectives of the experiment.'3 4 However, in order to elicit adequate participation, it
was also necessary to offer subjects extra course credit equal to two points out of
150 available points.13 The experiment consisted of multiple sessions using five to
fifteen subjects per session. Each subject was assigned an individual computer ter-
minal. Subjects participated in one session only. At the beginning of each session,
the experiment administrator gave subjects ample time to read the written instruc-
tions.'3 6 The administrator then read the instructions out loud and responded to
questions. Prior to beginning the simulations, the administrator ran a tutorial that
covered simulation procedure. During this scripted tutorial, the administrator
walked the subjects through a simulated lawsuit. A subject's final pay was based on
the subject's retum from one of the last four simulations in a session.137
3. Differences Between Conditions and Implementation of Scrutiny
The experiment included two contingent fee conditions and an hourly fee
condition. Furthermore, the experiment employed scrutiny with the hourly fee con-
dition and one of the two contingent fee conditions (" CFS'), whereas no scrutiny
was applied to the second contingent fee condition ("CF"). Under hourly fee and
contingent fee conditions, the instructions informed subjects that they were attor-
neys representing a client. Hourly fee subjects received the amount they spent plus
their endowments as compensation.
133 In addition, I used forty-seven students in a pilot study to test aspects of the experimental design
including the clarity of instructions, the cost functions, and the appropriate stakes. None of the forty-seven
students participated in the final experiment
134 See supra text accompanying notes 125-126.
135 In a previous study conducted by the author, volunteer rates were much lower without the extra
credit inducement Despite the ineffectiveness of money as a method for attracting student volunteers, the
possibility of winning money did provide the desired incentives once students agreed to participate.
136 Written instructions and experiment software are on file with the author.
137 The subject's pay equaled one-third of his or her return selected at random from one of the last
four cases (the "counted return'). To enhance subject incentives, one to three randomly chosen subjects,
referred to as lottery winners, per session received undiscounted payments for their counted return. For
example, ifa subject's counted return was $28, he received a check for $9.33. However, if that subject was a
lottery winner, he received a check for $28. The experiment guaranteed subjects a minimum payment of $7.
Earnings before applying the minimum payment ranged from less than $3 to over $60. These earnings aver-
aged $11.60.
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The experiment used a multi-step process to implement scrutiny. The ex-
periment employed deception in conditions without scrutiny to convince subjects
that no one was observing their actions."a Instructions informed subjects that deci-
sions were entirely their own.' The CF instructions directed subjects to act in their
dlient's best interests and also falsely informed subjects that their decisions were
invisible to the experiment administrator and could not be traced. In addition, the
instructions continued that the simulation retained only enough information for the
experiment administrator to calculate their pay. After starting each of the final four
simulated lawsuits, the experiment administrator left the computer terminal used to
administer the experiment and sat at an adjoining table that clearly did not have a
sightline to either the control terminal or any of the subject terminals. During each
simulation, the administrator pretended to read a book or write in a notebook, being
careful not to look at any subjects. At the conclusion of the allotted time for each
simulation, the administrator returned to the control terminal and began the next
simulation. Thus, experiment procedures encouraged subjects in these conditions to
believe that their actions were entirely free of scrutiny.
In conditions with evaluative scrutiny, experiment procedure encouraged
subjects to believe that their actions were under scrutiny. In these two conditions,
the instructions directed subjects to act in the best interest of their clients in accor-
dance with their agency roles as attorneys. To reinforce this directive, a blinking
message appeared periodically on each subject's computer screen reminding the
subject to act in his client's best interests. The experiment administrator informed
each subject that he controlled the experiment from his computer terminal. Al-
though the administrator did not inform subjects that he could observe their actions
from his terminal, the administrator's careful focus on his screen during each
simulation suggested that he was in fact observing their choices. The administra-
tor's behavior together with the blinking messages were intended to give subjects
the impression that their actions were observed. 14o
13 Based on the literature, implementing scrutiny is far easier than creating an unscrutinized treat-
ment due to the existence of the administrator bias. See infra note 139. Therefore, it was necessary to take
far more elaborate steps to create the perception of an observation-free environment in the unscrutinized
treatments.
139 Studies have shown that subjects are concerned with and influenced by their perception of the
experimenter's opinion of them. See, e.g., ARONSON ET AL, supra note 112, at 304-305 (rats as well as
human performance varied with the experimenter's perception of the subject); BROCKNER & RUBIN, supra
note 8, at 104 (pleasing the experiment administrator is a driving psychological force in subjects). Therefore,
the experimental design focus on creating the appearance in the unscrutinized treatments that the experiment
administrator was not concerned with or paying attention to subject decisions.
140 Other studies have used a variety of methods to implement evaluative scrutiny. One study had
several graduate students present during sessions as observers. Subject decisions appeared to be independent
of these observers. See BROCKNER & RUBIN, supra note 8, at 105-108. The absence of a reaction was most
likely due to the non-evaluative nature of the observer's scrutiny and the continued presence of the experi-
ment administrator. Id. If subjects were motivated to satisfy the experiment administrator's objectives, then
the presence of outside observers would be irrelevant as long as the administrator did not change. Id An-
other study used a fictional company to implement scrutiny. Subjects made investment decisions for a corpo-
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4. Conditions
The experiment assigned subjects in the fee arrangement conditions to
subgroups distinguished by the level of stakes they faced. No individual subject
faced more than one fee arrangement or stakes level in their respective simulations.
I tested $20, $30, and $60 stakes (" Stakes-20," "Stakes-30," and "Stakes-60,"
respectively) in interests-aligned, CFS, and hourly fee conditions. In addition, I also
tested Stakes-90 for the CFS and Stakes-7 for the interests-aligned condition for
additional hypothesis testing.141 For tests involving interests-aligned, CFS and
hourly fee conditions, I used Stakes-20, Stakes-30 and Stakes-60. Furthermore, for
the unscrutinized CF condition, I tested Stakes-20 (low) and Stakes-90 (high) only
due to funding limitations. Even though this condition was limited to two stakes
levels, the data obtained was sufficient to test the question of whether evaluative
scrutiny impacts the behavior of contingent fee attorneys. 4 2
D. Results
The primary objective of the experimental analysis was to examine the im-
pact of scrutiny on contingent fee-attorney litigation effort in a controlled environ-
ment. To achieve this objective, the analysis addresses two primary questions. First,
whether the presence of scrutiny induces subjects to invest more heavily in the
litigation effort than they would in the absence of such scrutiny, and if so, how this
added effort compares with interests-aligned and hourly fee attorney effort. The
comparison between the two contingent fee arrangements tells us whether scrutiny
can elicit additional effort from attorneys in litigation. The remaining comparisons
give us some idea of how the additional effort compares to effort under two base-
line fee arrangements.
The statistical analysis tests five hypotheses. To keep the discussion as ap-
proachable as possible, I have relegated the statistical analysis to the Appendix.
ration and then were told whether or not the company's board approved the decision. See Fox & Straw, supra
note 74 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. Subsequent decisions
varied depending on whether the subject had received board support. Other studies have noted that subject
behavior can be influenced by an instructor or the experiment administrator. Apparently, subjects often feel
an obligation, akin perhaps, to a fiduciary obligation to please the administrator. See discussion supra note
139. Hence, the continued presence of the experiment administrator and frequent reminders of the subject's
duty provided the required scrutiny.
141 Economic theory predicts that contingent fee attorneys ignore their agency obligations and maxi-
mize their own returns. Mathematically, this selfish behavior is equivalent to a contingent fee subject be-
having as though he was in an incentive-aligned group with one-third the stakes. Therefore, if this behavior
occurred, then there would be no statistical difference between CFS-20, 60 and 90, and incentive-aligned-7,
20 and 30, respectively. However, the analysis of the variance test I ran showed that the two fee arrange-
ments were statistically different from each other at the .01 level of significance. For a description of the
analysis of the variance test see infra text accompanying notes 226-227.
142 Experiments frequently use high and low factors to test the effects of alternative treatments. See,
e.g., Tosi supra note 43.
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The discussion provided in the text identifies the tested hypotheses and presents the
motivation for each tested hypothesis. After this discussion I provide the conclu-
sions that I draw from the statistical analysis.
1. Hypotheses
Hypothesis One. Contingent fee attorneys subject to scrutiny exert
greater litigation effort than unscrutinized contingent fee attorneys.
Economic theory contends that contingent fee attorneys exert less effort
than their clients would select.143 This reticence should be particularly pervasive
when there is little danger of losing face from a poor result. Hence, the standard
economic model predicts that contingent fee subjects shirk. However, the presence
of scrutiny should induce attorneys to exert effort in excess of the economic
model's prediction. 144 The rational behavior of maximizing one's payoff is coun-
tered by the psychological need to avoid looking bad in a competitive situation.
The presence of a principal or other observer focusing critical attention on the per-
formance of the attorney may induce effort that exceeds the attorney's profit
maximizing level.
Hypothesis Two. Effort investments are greater in high-stakes cases
than in low-stakes cases for contingent fee and interests-aligned at-
torneys.
Other than the expected difference between contingent fee arrangements
due to scrutiny, decisions made in the experiment should be consistent with eco-
nomic theory. Economic theory predicts that attorney effort investments increase
with stakes for interests-aligned and contingent fee arrangements.1 45 For these fee
arrangements, attorneys' expected returns are positively correlated with the stakes
(i.e. the greater the stakes the greater the expected return holding all else constant).
Hence, it follows that the incremental benefit of added effort is greater in a high-
stakes case than in a low-stakes case. 46 If the experiment is consistent with eco-
nomic theory, then whether scrutiny is present or not, attorney effort should in-
crease with the stakes.
Hypothesis Three. Contingent fee attorney litigation effort in the
143 See generally discussion supra Part II.A.
144 See generally discussion supra Part III.B.
145 If the marginal cost of effort is constant or independent of stakes, then greater stakes provide
increased marginal returns to effort These greater marginal returns provide an incentive to exert greater
effort See supra note 26 and accompanying text
146 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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presence of scrutiny is not significantly different from client-welfare-
maximizing attorney effort.
Although it appears that contingent fee attorneys subject to scrutiny exceed
the effort level that economic theory suggests, these attorneys may still exert less
(or more) effort than their clients prefer. To maximize clients' welfare, attorney
effort should be neither substantially greater nor substantially less than the effort
that the hypothetical interests-aligned attorney would choose in the case. 147 There-
fore, to test this hypothesis, I compare the effort of the CFS groups with that of the
interests-aligned groups.
Hypothesis Four. Hourly fee attorney effort investments are inde-
pendent of stakes.
Economic theory predicts that hourly fee attorneys should be insensitive to
the stakes because their returns are independent of case outcome.1 48 The return of
hourly fee attorneys increases with their effort and not with the stakes available.
Hence, there should be little correlation between stakes and attorney effort.
Hypothesis Five. Contingent-fee-attorney-litigation effort subject to
scrutiny does not differ significantly from the litigation efforts of
hourly fee attorneys.
The positive correlation between hourly-fee-attorney return and effort sug-
gests that hourly fee attorneys have strong incentives to invest heavily in effort.14 9
The more effort the attorney exerts, the greater his return. Economically, the only
limitation on the hourly fee attorney's effort investment is his client's willingness
to pay and available time.15° Thus, given this incentive structure, one might expect
hourly fee attorneys to outspend attorneys working under other fee arrangements.
Therefore, under the assumption that there is a positive economic return to effort,
hourly fee attorneys who outspend other attorneys should win the majority of close
cases when facing contingent fee attorneys.15' It follows that overspending hourly
147 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
148 The disconnect between the hourly fee attorneys interests and case characteristics are so great that
it may be difficult to limit hours or even settle the case under an hourly fee arrangement. See William G.
Ross, The Ethics of Hourly fee Billing by Attorneys, 44 RUTGERS L. REv. 1 (1991) (reporting that over 50%
of attorneys believe that other attorneys overbill their hours occasionally to frequently); Rhode, supra note
45, at 635; Miller, supra note 17, at 203 (observing that a purely self-interested hourly fee attorney never
settles even when settling is in his client's best interest).
149 See Miller, supra note 17, at 203.
150 Id.
151 However, empirical research has not uncovered a connection between effort and outcome. See
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fee attorneys should win more civil cases in which they are often paired against a
supposedly underspending contingent fee attorney. The implication of this argu-
ment is that defendants should hold a decided edge in cases that go to trial.
However, there is little evidence to suggest that hourly fee attorneys have
such an advantage. Priest and Klein argue that plaintiffs win approximately fifty
percent of all cases.' 52 Although this controversial claim has been rejected by
many, research does not support the proposition that plaintiff win rates are less than
50%.ls3 The presence of scrutiny in high-profile cases may explain in part the ab-
sence of a clear defense bias in win rates. Scrutiny from principals, media and in-
terested outsiders may induce contingent fee attorneys to increase their effort to
levels comparable with those of defense attorneys. If so then this effort would equal
or exceed that of interests-aligned attorneys whose effort is bounded by that of
hourly fee attorney effort.
2. Conclusions
The data provides strong support for Hypotheses one and two and partial
support for Hypothesis Three. The difference between contingent fee groups with
and without scrutiny was significant at the .05 level with p = .04,1s4 which supports
the hypothesis that scrutiny elicits increased effort. In addition to the relationship
between effort and scrutiny, the increase in effort over different stakes was also
significant in both contingent fee cases, p = .0 3 ,"s and in the interests-aligned
groups, p<.01.'6s This latter result supports the hypothesis that effort increases with
stakes. I found no significant difference between CFS and interests-aligned expen-
Kritzer et a, supra note 51, at 270 n.25. The lack of a correlation in empirical data may be due to escalation
of commitment on both sides which would tend to neutralize the other side's hoped-for gains. See infra note
245. If the two sides use the other side as a model for their effort decision, then the two sides counter each
escalation with a counter-balancing increase resulting in no observed gained. See supra notes 80-82 and
accompanying text (discussing the role of models in promoting escalation behavior). Of course if this be-
havior does occur, then failing to match the other side's increases puts the non-escalating litigant at a disad-
vantage thereby feeding the entrapping effect of the encounter.
152 See Priest & Klein supra note 47.
153 Empirical work in fact suggests that plaintiff win rates vary substantially depending on the nature
of the case. In reported data, plaintiffwin rates ranged from a low of twelve percent in land condemnation
cases to over ninety percent in third-party suits against the IRS. See Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selec-
tion Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337,357-358 (1990).
164 See Table Al in the Appendix. The parameterp is the probability that the magnitude of the rele-
vant statistic occurred by chance. In essence, p represents the probability that the variation in the data attibu-
table to the associated variable is zero. Forp small, usually .05 or less, it is very unlikely that this variation is
zero, so we can conclude that the treatment effect has a significant impact on the variable in question. See
SAM K. KACHIGAN, STATISTICAL ANALYsts 276-279 (1986).
155 See Table Al in the Appendix.
156 See Table A2 in the Appendix.
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ditures' 5 7 This finding supports the hypothesis that scrutiny elicits welfare-
maximizing attorney behavior. However, the coarseness of the data does not allow
me to draw such a strong inference. The data can vary quite substantially before
statistical tests identify any differences. Therefore, the lack of a detectable statisti-
cal difference between data from the two groups provides only tentative support for
the hypothesis. Additional tests must be taken before unequivocally accepting the
conclusion that scrutiny elicits optimal investments from attorneys.
Although the data also provides support for Hypothesis four, the data is in-
conclusive with respect to Hypothesis five. The data supports the hypothesis that
hourly fee expenditures do not vary with the stakes. Unlike in the tests for other fee
arrangements, the stakes variable in the hourly fee condition test was not statisti-
cally significant.5 8 The absence of significance suggests that there were no signifi-
cant variations due to stakes in the hourly fee data. Hence, subjects' expenditure
decisions did not vary with the stakes. This independence from stakes was also
reflected in the settlement rates, which varied in the narrow range .52 - .65.'59 The
statistical analysis I used to test hypothesis five was also insignificant. However, an
examination of the data suggests the existence of a complex relationship between
the two fee arrangements. In the experiment, hourly fee subjects outspent CFS
subjects when stakes were low, but there was little difference in expenditures when
stakes were high.1'6 Hence, whereas hourly fee expenditures substantially exceeded
CFS expenditures when stake were $20 (7.56 versus 4.90), there was little differ-
ence when stakes were $60 (7.90 versus 7.78).161 Probably due to the differences
between high-and-low-stakes cases, the test of this hypothesis was not statistically
significant. Although the variable that measured the difference between fee ar-
rangements was significant at the .05 level (p = .03), the lack of overall significance
for this test precludes concluding that expenditures differed significantly between
hourly fee and CFS subjects.
157 See Table A4 in the Appendix.
158 In the ANOVA for the hourly fee data, the Fstatistic for Stakes was .94 with ap value of.40. The
only statistically significant variable was Trial (F = 38.79 and p < .000 1). This result suggests that subjects
who went to trial spent more pre-trial than did their settling counterparts. This may be due to these trial sub-
jects spending at the same rate as their settling counterparts but taking longer to resolve their disputes.
159 See Table A2 in the Appendix.
160 See Table Al in the Appendix.
161 The difference between expenditures for the two fee arrangements at $20 was statistically signifi-
cant at the .05 level (t = 2.6, p = .013). The corresponding difference for stakes = $60 was not statistically
significant. (t =.I l,p =.91).
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E. Data Implications
The results provide strong support for the hypothesis that scrutiny induces
contingent fee attorneys to exert effort in excess of predictions from economic the-
ory. Investment decisions made under scrutiny exceeded corresponding unscruti-
nized effort in both low and high-stakes cases. Moreover, effort from the scruti-
nized contingent fee group equaled or surpassed effort of the interests-aligned
group and the hourly fee group in high-stakes cases. Although one might be
tempted to draw the conclusion that scrutiny induces client-welfare-maximizing
effort, the data is too coarse to draw such specific inferences. Scrutiny may elicit
more or less than client-welfare-maximizing effort, and the additional elicited effort
may vary significantly from case to case. Nevertheless, I can conclude that in com-
petitive litigated disputes, scrutiny fosters escalating commitment in individuals,
which results in enhanced effort. Due to the psychological basis of this phenome-
non, it is highly unlikely that attorneys fare any better in such situations. The result
of such behavior is protracted and costly litigation for which opposing sides have
difficulty resolving their disputes outside of trial or the threat of trial." z
Other than the behavior attributed to scrutiny, the data is mostly consistent
with economic predictions. Contingent fee subjects were sensitive to the size of
stakes, investing less in low-stakes case and more in high-stakes cases. Interests-
aligned subjects also showed an increasing expenditure trend with stakes. However,
their expenditures plateaued at Stakes-30 and then declined slightly." Although
the difference between Stakes-30 and Stakes-60 was not significantly different, the
absence of an increasing trend between these two stakes levels is curious. The set-
tlement rates enumerated in Table A2 may partially explain this observation.' 64
Settlement rates for the interests-aligned group started at .71 for Stakes-7 and rose
fairly consistently to .81 at Stakes-60. Hence, roughly 14% more subjects settled at
the highest stakes level than at the lowest stakes.
These differences in settlement rates suggest that interests-aligned subjects
may have been more risk averse in high-stakes cases. The computer program ac-
cepted settlement offers based on the percentage of stakes the offer represented.
Therefore, a greater settlement rate indicates that subjects made offers that were a
lower percentage of stakes than offers made in cases with lower settlement rates.
Hence, subjects in high-stakes cases made lower relative offers than did subjects in
lower-stakes cases. 6 The willingness to make these lower demands suggests that
162 Seesupra note 79 (discussing how the threat of impending trial can break a deadlock in litigation
and prompt a settlement).
163 See infra Table Al in the Appendix.
164 See infra Table A2 in the Appendix.
165 For example, in a Stakes-7 case, the program would always accept a 50% demand of $3.50.
Hence, the .71 settlement rate indicates that roughly 71% of the subjects made a $10 demand. In Stakes-60
cases, the 50% threshold was $30. In these cases, the .81 settlement rate indicates that about 81% of the
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high-stakes subjects preferred receiving a lower proportion of the stakes for certain
rather than gambling at receiving the entire amount. Thus, high-stakes subjects
were more risk-averse. Although further research is needed to determine the gene-
sis of this change in risk-preference, I suspect it is due to a wealth effect and pros-
pect theory. 66 The small gains obtainable by settling low-stakes cases were not
sufficient to induce subjects to forgo a chance at receiving the entire amount at
trial. However, in high-stakes cases, subjects found the reward for settling prefer-
able to the trial risk. This is consistent with prospect theory, which suggests that
decision-makers are risk-averse when choices are framed as gains rather than
losses.167
Whereas the unscrutinized contingent fee group appeared to be as risk-
averse as the interests-aligned group, the scrutinized group did not show signs of
risk aversion. The increasing settlement rates for the unscrutinized group compared
with the decreasing settlement rates for the scrutinized group supports this conclu-
sion.' 68 The CFS settlement rates declined from .78 at Stakes-20 to .52 at Stakes-
90. Clearly the risk-aversion observed in data for the other groups was not present
in CFS data. 169 Rather, the data suggests that the effects of scrutiny may have been
more pronounced in high-stakes cases. In low-stakes cases, a solvency constraint
probably buffered the effects of scrutiny. Although the pressure of scrutiny may
have influenced subjects in these cases, the certainty that excessive spending would
result in a negative return tended to counter the effect. Facing a losing proposition
gave subjects the excuse to quit before their losses mounted. Why spend more if the
client is certain to lose money even if the attorney wins the case? In essence, the
CFS subjects in low-stakes cases quit when they ran out of money. This limitation
was not an issue in high-cases. The return from a victory in a high-stakes case more
than covered the cost of excess effort. Whereas an extra ten dollars spent in a
Stakes-20 case all but insured a loss, the same ten dollar expenditure in a Stakes-90
case could produce a positive return. Therefore, without the insolvency constraint,
an attorney subject to scrutiny would have difficulty resisting the psychological
desire to rationalize his case investments through additional expenditures.
Hourly fee subjects, by contrast, showed no significant sensitivity to the
subjects made settlement demands of $30 or less. Thus, over 14% more Stakes-60 subjects made 50% or less
settlement demands than did Stakes-7 subjects.
166 See supra note 119 and accompanying text
167 See supra note 119 and accompanying text
168 See infra Table A2 in the Appendix.
169 This result is particularly striking in light of the prospect theory study discussed previously in
which attorney decisions exhibited risk-aversion. See supra notes 118-122 and accompanying text The
major difference is that the previous study was static and noncompetitive. Attorney's reviewed the case
description, answered a questionnaire and then made their decision. In this, escalation behavior, which is
inherently dynamic, was allowed to build as subjects repeatedly made purchase decisions and received feed-
back under evaluative scrutiny. Thus, it is likely the necessary elements for escalation were not present in the
static study. Id
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stakes. Expenditure and settlement rates were very consistent showing little of the
variability observed in the interests-aligned and contingent fees data. Expenditures
were consistently higher than expenditures under other fee arrangements. These
results were consistent with expectations. Research suggests that attorneys in
hourly fee cases are relatively insensitive to economic factors, focusing instead on
the quality of representation and winning the case.170 Interestingly, my concern that
hourly fee subjects would ignore the case and spend excessively was not realized.
Under the scenario, hourly fee subjects could maximize their payoffs by spending
the maximum each round and refusing to settle.171 Although hourly fee subjects did
outspend subjects working under other fee arrangements, the differences were not
substantial. In fact, for high-stakes cases there was no significant difference be-
tween hourly fee and CFS expenditures. 72 In an earlier study, researchers observed
a crossover point at which contingent fee expenditures equaled and then exceeded
hourly fee expenditures. 73 The data is consistent with that earlier finding. Although
I lacked a Stakes-90 data point for hourly fee subjects, the CFS Stakes-90 amount
exceeded all hourly fee expenditure rates. Although this observation does not meet
any measure of statistical significance, together with the earlier study it suggests
that the observed behavior may not be unique.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR ATTORNEY BEHAVIOR AND FEE REFORM
A. Applicability to Attorney Behavior
Although one could argue that practicing attorneys are not as vulnerable to
escalation and face saving behavior, such arguments are not persuasive. Research-
ers have observed the role of scrutiny in escalation in many other settings. 74 There-
fore, the trap is likely to be quite prevalent and not due to an idiosyncratic experi-
mental design. Given the high susceptibility that people have for succumbing to
face-saving behavior, it is unlikely that even experienced attorneys resist it without
consciously working to avoid the entrapping effects of escalating commitment.
Such resistance requires learning from prior mistakes, a skill that few people mas-
170 See Robert . Gertner & Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement Escrows, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 87, 98
(1995) (asserting that hourly-fee-attorney cost indifference and the requirement for concurrent or advanced
payment puts the hourly fee arrangement out of the reach of many litigants); See also Kritzer et al., supra
note 51 (presenting data that indicates that hourly fee attorneys work diligently in their clients' interests but
may be less attuned to costs than are their clients).
171 See Miller, supra note 17, at 203 ("[A] purely rational and self-interested attorney would never
settle an hourly fee case in which he or she is working for a profit").
172 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
173 See Kritzer et al., supra note 51, at 267.
174 See supra note 74 and accompanying text
43
Thomas: Psychological Impact of Scrutiny on Contingent Fee Attorney Effor
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1998
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
ter.17
5
People, even trained professionals, have trouble learning from experience.
The difficulty trained professionals have in learning from experience is well docu-
mented.176 As two decision theorists put it, "experience is inevitable; learning is
not." 177 Attorneys are almost certain to be susceptible to this same failing. In de-
briefing a completed case, an attorney is likely to focus on the effectiveness of his
research and investigative efforts. He might also evaluate the effectiveness of his
settlement or trial techniques in hopes of enhancing these skills in future cases.
However, it is unlikely that many attorneys consider whether their effort or will-
ingness to resolve a dispute was negatively influenced by scrutiny, or the competi-
tiveness of the situation. This failure to explicitly consider this potential pitfall al-
most guarantees that attorneys do not overcome the entrapping effects of escalating
commitment.
178
The nature of litigation and psychological biases stand in the way of attor-
neys discovering their susceptibility to escalating commitment. Litigation is fre-
quently compared to battle or war with the two sides characterized as antagonists or
warriors engaged in hand-to-hand combat.179 This highly-charged competitive at-
mosphere contributes to escalating commitment.1 80 Hence, the psychological desire
to keep up and not be bested by the other side makes it difficult for attorneys to
realize that they are entrapped. People also have a need to believe they are in con-
trol of their environment. 181 Admitting or even considering that one may have suc-
cumbed to the entrapping effects of escalation requires admitting that we do not
have complete control. Instead, it requires considering that our behavior may have
175 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
176 See supra notes 123-126 and accompanying text
177 See Russo & SCHOEMAKER, supra note 123, at 174.
178 For an outline of the requirements for effective learning, see supra note 117. Sometimes even
recognizing a psychological trap is not enough to avoid it In a dollar auction that I conducted in a class, one
of the bidders had witnessed a previous running of the auction and believed he could beat the game by bid-
ding $0.90. For a description of the dollar auction, see supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text With a
minimum bid increase often cents, the next bid had to be $1 or greater. The student was shocked to find that
someone did indeed outbid him. When the game was completed, the overconfident initial bidder's final bid
was $6.10! Thus, even someone familiar with escalation behavior can become entrapped.
179 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Lawyers in Litigation, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 509, 510-511 (1994) ("Today, the dominant popular view is that lawyers magnify the inher-
ent divisiveness of dispute resolution."). In fact, Gilson and Mnookin identify a whole string of literature that
evokes the metaphor of the attorney as Rambo, a fictional guerrilla warrior who takes no prisoners. Id. at 511
n.9 (citing The Tenth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, 146 F.RID. 205, 216 (1992) (discussing "the Rambo Litigator"); Thomas M. Reavley, Rambo Litiga-
tors: Pitting Aggressive Tactics Against Legal Ethics, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 637, 637 (1990); Leonard N Ring,
The Incivility Crisis, TRIAL, Aug. 1993, at 78-80; Helen W. Nies, Rambo Lawyering: The Needfor Civility in
Civil Litigation, 32 IDEA 1, 12 (1991)).
180 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text
181 See RuSSO & SCHOEMAKER, supra note 123, at 177.
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resulted from external stimuli. 82 In addition, we are all susceptible to rationaliza-
tion. Distorted memory, shifting blame, and changing preferences are all elements
of rationalization." Hence rather than recognizing escalating commitment, an at-
torney may rationalize that he wanted to exert the additional effort, or that the effort
was no greater than he exerts in less competitive, less-public cases. Thus, it is
highly unlikely that experienced attorneys recognize their susceptibility to escalat-
ing commitment, much less ward off its entrapping effects.
B. Implications of the Experiment for Fee Reform
The ability of scrutiny to escalate attorney commitment and effort has sig-
nificant implications for regulating attorney fee arrangements. Escalation induces
attorneys to invest more in litigation and reduces their willingness to settle. Instead
of seeking to resolve a case in his client's best interests, an entrapped attorney may
try to prove he is right, avoid losing face and best the other side's attorney) 84 The
entrapped attorney is likely to continue investing in the case until his client forces
him to quit or settle, the other side capitulates to his demands, or the attorney has
exhausted all means of financing the case. The implications of these responses have
strong implications for fee reform efforts. For example, in a high-stakes case, a cap
limit on attorney returns is unlikely to reduce the effort level of a well-financed
contingent fee attorney, whereas a contingent fee attorney without substantial re-
sources may reject the cap-limited case or seek a quick settlement. The remainder
of this section discusses fee reform implications in detail.
1. Graduated Payment Schemes
The implications of escalating commitment are that measures designed to
increase the client's share of a court award may not work as designed nor have the
effects predicted by economic theory. Reform measures generally provide for
graduated payments, a cap on the contingent percentage, or are a hybrid under
which payment depends on satisfaction of certain conditions.' 85 For example, one
182 Al
183 Id. at 179.
184 See generally discussion supra Part III.B.
185 Several states currently have contingent fee reforms ("limits") in place. See CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 52-251c (1997) (sliding scale for personal injury, wrongful death, and property damage actions); MICH.
CT. R. 8.121 (1997) (maximum one-third limit for personal injury or wrongful death actions in Michigan);
N.J. R. GEN. APPLICATION 1:21-7 (1997) (sliding scale for tort suits); N.Y. CLS Sup. Ct. §§ 603.7(e),
691.20(e) (1998) (providing choice between sliding scale and capped contingent fee for personal injury or
wrongful death suits). Other states have enacted limits on contingent fee payments associated with medical
malpractice cases. These statutes take the form of a declining graduated payment scheme. See, e.g., 735 ILL.
ComP. STAT. 5/2-1114 (West 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN tit. 24, § 2961 (West 1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 231 § 601 (West 1997); Wis. STAT. § 655.013 (1995-1996).
45
Thomas: Psychological Impact of Scrutiny on Contingent Fee Attorney Effor
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1998
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
proposal would increase the allowable contingent percentage based on how far the
case goes thereby increasing the attorney's incentive to exert effort as litigation
becomes more time consuming. 186 Another proposal, typical of decreasing gradu-
ated payment schemes, would allow attorneys to take a maximum of 25% of the
first $50,000, 15% of the next $50,000, and 10% of any amount above $100,000
recovered in litigation.
187
The theoretical benefit of graduated payment schemes is that they reduce
the share that an attorney receives without eliminating the attorney's incentive to
invest in the case. 88 In increasing schemes, the attorney receives a small amount
when little effort is required and a bigger percentage as the level of effort increases.
Therefore, he should work harder.189 However, this scheme is problematic in that it
contributes to escalating commitment by rewarding attorneys for prolonging cases.
The attorney is unlikely to be in a hurry to settle because he gets a bigger share by
waiting. However, once he gets serious, he may find that he cannot obtain a better
settlement than one that was previously available. At this point face-saving and
rationalization may kick in to prolong the lawsuit until the attorney finds a way to
explain why the best available settlement now was unacceptable earlier.' 90 Thus,
what might happen with increasing graduated payment schemes is that many cases
settle immediately with most of the remaining cases going to trial. Hence, rather
than increasing the client's share, the proposal may instead dissipate greater pro-
portions of large returns through excessive attorney effort.' 9'
A decreasing graduated payment scheme based on the case return avoids
this perverse incentive structure by decoupling the percentage from case length.
Under a scheme linked to the case return, attorneys still have incentives to continue
investing in cases because their returns increase, albeit at a lower rate, with clients'
returns. Hence, as with a standard contingent fee arrangement, attorneys' expected
returns increase only if they invest more in cases. However, this lower rate is also
the source of criticism. The lower percentage that attorneys receive supplies re-
186 See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD
852, 854 (1994).
187 This proposal entitled the Lawyer's Fair Fee Act, or Proposition 106 was defeated as a 1988 Cali-
fornia ballot measure. Proposed Cal. Bus. & Prof Code § 6146.1, California Secretary of State, Ballot Pam-
phlet 110, 111 (General Election Nov. 8, 1988) (hereinafter "California Measure") Contingent fee limits for
medical malpractice cases typically employ a declining graduated formula similar to the California measure.
See supra note 185.
188 This discussion implicitly includes percentage caps because such caps are merely graduated pay-
ments with a single allowable level.
189 See RHODE, supra note 186, at 854.
190 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text
191 The judicial system is already subject to criticisms of prolonged litigation. Wayne D. Brazil, The
Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295
(1978) (discussing how the adversarial nature of civil litigation and hourly fees provides attorneys with in-
centives to protract and complicate discovery). This proposal may exacerbate the problem.
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duced incentives to exert effort. The lower return leaves attorneys able to exert less
effort while their marginal returns exceed marginal costs. Hence, attorneys are un-
likely to exert as much effort resulting in a worst performance than the already
suboptimal contingent fee.192
This conjectured pitfall with graduated-payment schemes might not, con-
sidering the impact of scrutiny, be as problematic as theory suggests. First consider
the scheme's impact on high-stakes cases for which escalation of attorney com-
mitment is likely to be prevalent. Such entrapped attorneys are likely to be more
concerned with winning than with profit-maximization. Therefore, unless the attor-
ney is losing money on the case, his case investment may not differ substantially
under the scheme from his investment under a standard contingent fee."9 This con-
clusion changes for low-stakes cases, cases that are not subject to scrutiny, or
graduated payment schemes that so drastically curtail the attorney's fees that he
stands to lose money by maintaining a high effort level. 19 The low-stakes and un-
scrutinized attorney is less likely to be subject to escalating commitment, 95 and the
potential of losing money is likely to break the escalation spell. 19 Hence, a gradu-
ated-payment scheme that reduces the attorney's return too quickly may induce
attorneys in low-stakes cases to curtail effort.
It follows that a carefully crafted graduated-payment scheme can achieve
the'objective of increasing the client's share of settlements and court awards with-
out substantially reducing the quality of attorney representation. Most high-stakes
cases are likely to be high profile and subject to scrutiny. Hence, a graduated-
payment scheme is likely to have little impact on attorney effort in these cases pro-
vided the restrictions are not excessive. In cases that are not high-stakes, attorneys
are likely to be more sensitive to their personal return in the absence of scrutiny.
However, since most of the unscrutinized, low profile cases have low-stakes, the
awards obtained from such cases are likely to fall within the initial and highest
percentage level. Therefore, the percentage on the initial level of recovery must be
large enough to maintain adequate attorney incentives to work.
97
Reforms that may satisfy these requirements include a 1988 California
ballot that allowed a one-third share of the first $50,000 award, and medical mal-
practice contingent fee limits with initial levels that range from $100,000 (Maine)
to $1,000,000 (Wisconsin). 9 Whether these levels are sufficient to maintain ade-
192 See RHODE, supra note 186, at 854.
193 PATRICIA DANZON, NEW EVIDENCE ON THE FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS: A SUMMARY OF RESEARCH RESULTS 5 (1986).
194 Id at 5, 9.
195 See supra discussion accompanying notes 103-105.
196 See supra discussion accompanying note 169.
197 For a theoretical analysis of optimal contingent fee percentages see Hay, supra note 17.
198 See supra note 186, at 854.
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quate attorney incentives in low-to-moderate-stakes cases is an empirical
question. 99 Nevertheless, there is evidence that suggests that these initial levels
provide attorneys with adequate incentives. Researchers in the 1980s found that
contingent fee effort equaled hourly fee effort in cases valued as low as $6,000.200
Therefore, even accounting for inflation, $50,000 to $100,000 for the initial level
along with an appropriate percentage rate is likely to provide adequate attorney
incentives.
2. The Manhattan Proposal
An alternative approach proposed by Manhattan Institute fellows ("the
Manhattan proposal") provides one of the more unique and popular methods of
shifting case returns to clients.201 The premise of the Manhattan proposal is to
maximize the client's return by preventing contingent fee attorneys from obtaining
unearned fees. Underlying the Manhattan proposal arguments is the premise that
attorneys shirk and take cases for which they do not have to put forth much effort.
These are cases for which liability is uncontroversial or the defendant for whatever
reason does not want to contest the claim.20 2 The Manhattan proposal achieves its
return-shifting objective by limiting the returns contingent fee attorneys receive.
The proposal limits the attorney's recovery to at most ten percent of an initial de-
fendant settlement offer made within sixty days of receiving the plaintiffs com-
plaint.03 If the plaintiff rejects the settlement offer, the Manhattan proposal then
restricts the attorney's return to a percentage of the amount obtained in excess of
the initial settlement offer plus at most ten percent of that initial offer amount. This
rule forces a contingent fee attorney who receives a settlement offer to decide
whether it is worth it to pursue a greater return. If an attorney rejects an initial offer
and does not receive a greater reward or settlement later, he gets no return for his
additional effort.
The Manhattan proposal provides a strong disincentive to continuing a
case past an initial settlement offer. To understand this implication, consider the
199 The definition of adequacy must be determined as well. In this analysis the baseline has been the
attorney effort that an omniscient plaintiff would have exerted in his behalf. However, this baseline does not
account for such externalities as court costs and the costs of creating bad law. See supra note 28. A true
determination of optimality would include these factors as well.
200 See Kritzer et al. supra note 51, at 269-270.
201 The Manhattan proposal was the basis of defeated 1996 reform measures introduced in the House
of Representatives and California- See Angela Wennihan, Let's Put the Contingency Back in the Contingency
Fee, 49 SMU L. REV. 1639, 1672-1673 (1996).
202 BRICKMAN ET. AL., supra note 2, at 20-22- There are lots of reasons why a defendant settles cases.
These reasons include finding it cheaper to settle than to incur litigation costs, not wanting to risk a huge
adverse judgment or wanting to avoid poor publicity. See Katz, supra note 52.
203 Payment is based on an hourly fee basis and limited to a maximum of ten percent BRICKMAN Er
AL., supra note 2, at 27-28.
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following example. Suppose a case has an expected return of $60,000. If the attor-
ney wins an award for this amount, he receives $20,000 under a one-third contin-
gent fee arrangement. Under the Manhattan proposal, the attorney's return depends
on whether the defendant makes a settlement offer and the amount of that offer. If
the defendant offers $45,000, then the attorney receives at most $4500 of this
amount. The utility-maximizing attorney must then decide whether to try to get
more.204 He must decide whether to put forth the effort required to recover the ad-
ditional gross $15,000 expected return.205 The additional investment yields a total
attorney return of $9,500 (the pre-settlement-offer $4500 plus the attorney's one-
third share of $15,000), a $10,500 reduction from the amount he receives without
the reform. This reduced potential return results in a reduced attorney incentive to
continue the case.2'5 Hence, the Manhattan proposal strongly encourages early set-
tlement.
The plaintiff may or may not be better off under the Manhattan proposal.
In the example, the attorney receives at most $4500 if the case settles after the first
offer and the plaintiff receives at least $40,500. This amount is in contrast to the
$40,000 the plaintiff receives from winning instead of settling the case under a one-
third contingent fee arrangement. Under the Manhattan proposal, the plaintiffs
share of a $60,000 judgment rises to $50,500, over $10,000 more than he receives
under a one-third contingent fee arrangement. Hence, in this example even if the
case settles the Manhattan proposal achieves its objective of limiting the attorney's
return while simultaneously maintaining plaintiff returns. However, the example is
sensitive to parameter changes. The plaintiff benefit drops precipitously if the de-
fendant's offer is lower. For example, if the defendant offers $30,000 instead of
$45,000, the plaintiffs share of the settlement is now $27,000, $13,000 less than
his pre-proposal return. The plaintiff may wish to reject the settlement offer in this
case, but can do so only if his attorney cooperates. The attorney's share for con-
tinuing and obtaining the additional $30,000 is $10,000. Although greater than the
$5000 potential gain in the previous example, the additional return is still substan-
tially less than the $20,000 the attorney would receive pre-proposal. Therefore, the
attorney's incentive to continue is substantially less than it is under a standard con-
tingent fee arrangement.20 7 If$10,000 is less than his opportunity costs, the utility-
204 The assumption is that the attorney is the decision-maker and can refuse to continue working on
the case if the plaintiff rejects the offer. I do not discuss the validity of this assumption. However, others
have argued that, for practical purposes, the attorney is indeed the decision-maker in litigation when he has a
financial stake in the outcome. See DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE?
(1977). If the plaintiff wishes to continue but his attorney does not, there is a clear conflict of interest See
Miller, supra note 17.
205 I am assuming that the overall expected return to attorney effort is unchanged whether the Man-
hattan proposal applies or the attorney works under a traditional contingent fee arrangement
206 See generally discussion supra Part ILA.
207 It is also substantially less than incentives under the California measure which does not reduce the
attorney's return until the clients award exceeded $50,000. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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maximizing attorney is unlikely to continue the case. Therefore, the Manhattan
proposal may actually reduce rather than increase plaintiff returns.
This result has its strongest implication for low-to-moderate-stakes cases.
In these cases scrutiny is limited or nonexistent so attorneys are likely to focus pri-
marily on utility maximization. In such cases the Manhattan proposal is likely to
encourage contingent fee attorneys to settle early due to the limited benefit of con-
tinuing the case. The defense in such cases is likely to take advantage of the limits
on the contingent fee attorney's return by making low-ball initial offers. With a
strategically chosen settlement offer, the Manhattan proposal restrictions almost
certainly makes the attorney-specific benefits from continuing a case past the initial
settlement offer negative. 8 If the attorney is unable to continue without losing
money, the plaintiff's recovery will be dramatically lower.20 9 Hence, whether the
attorney settles the case early, or rejects it outright, the Manhattan proposal will not
only limit the contingent fee attorney's return in low-stakes cases, but it will slash
the client's return as well. The Manhattan proposal also may have a chilling effect
on the ability of plaintiffs to obtain representation in low-to-moderate-stakes cases.
The severe limits on the contingent fee attorney's recovery may cause attorneys to
reject such cases outright or find creative ways to receive advance payment.210 For
plaintiffs unable to make such side payments, judicial access may be denied.
The impact of the Manhattan proposal in high-stakes cases is likely to be
quite different due to increases in scale and the impact of scrutiny. When the stakes
are high, the Manhattan proposal's restrictions may not be as big of a disincentive
because the returns from continuing are much greater. These returns may be suffi-
ciently large that losing money on the case is not an issue. In such situations, the
attorney is susceptible to escalating commitment due to the entrapping effects of
scrutiny and the adversarial nature of the case. 1 The defense has a lower probabil-
ity of successfully using a low-ball strategy in high-stakes cases because it is possi-
ble for the contingent fee attorney to make money by continuing litigation. In ef-
fect, the likely impact of low-ball offers may be to insult the contingent fee attor-
ney. If he interprets the low offer to signal a lack of respect then his anger might
result in yet greater escalation of the conflict.
To illustrate the difference that high-stakes makes for Manhattan proposal
implications, I recycle the example used previously to illustrate contingent fee in-
208 In light of the low expected return of such cases, attorneys may simply reject these cases because
the return does not exceed the opportunity costs of taking them. See Bimholz, supra note 25, at 962 (summa-
rizing the argument that fee limits make certain cases too unattractive for attorneys to accept).
209 Drastic reductions in attorneys' returns are known to result in reduced settlements and fewer cases
litigated to a verdict See Danzon, supra note 193.
210 Attorneys may exchange one abuse for another by requiring nonrefundable retainers. See Lester
Brickman & Lawrence A- Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers Revisited, 72 N.C. L REv. 1 (1993).
211 See generally discussion supra Part II1.B.
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centives.212 In that example, there are five possible actions that the attorney can
take, each with a known numerical benefit. For simplicity, each action has an iden-
tical cost of 12. The benefit of each of the actions in a low-stakes case from most
beneficial to least is 60, 45, 30, 15, and 6 using the same unit of measurement as
costs. The interests-aligned attorney performs all but the last action, whereas his
contingent fee attorney who receives a one-third contingent fee prefers to perform
only the two most beneficial actions.213 The key point is that although his effort is
suboptimal, the contingent fee attorney still invests in the case.
Now suppose the defendant makes a settlement offer under the Manhattan
proposal for one-half the expected case return. The impact of this offer is to cut the
value of continuing litigation in half. Hence, the feasible actions are now worth just
30, 22 1/2, 15, 7 1/2, and 3. The (risk-neutral) client prefers to continue because
there are three actions that provide a positive expected benefit. Specifically, the
client expects a net return of 31 1/2 from the attorney undertaking these three ac-
tions.214 However, the attorney entitled to receive only one-third of the additional
gain prefers not to continue the case because he cannot receive a positive expected
gain. His most beneficial action yields an expected return of -2 (30/3 - 12). Thus,
under the Manhattan proposal the attorney prefers to settle in a case in which the
client benefits by rejecting the initial offer.
Now suppose the stakes were higher. Specifically, consider the case in
which the expected award is doubled, all else equal. Also suppose that the defense
again makes an offer for one-half of the case expected return. The continuation
values of feasible actions are now 60, 45, 30, 15, and 6, twice the values for the
low-stakes example. Balanced against the unchanged costs per action of 12, the
attorney continues litigating because he has a positive expected return of 11 from
performing the two most beneficial actions. If the conflict escalates due to scrutiny,
a perceived insult and/or the competitiveness of the case, the attorney may opt to
undertake the third action as well. Although undertaking such an action does not
maximize his return, it may pay psychic dividends by helping the attorney save
face and rationalize his decisions.215
Thus, whereas the Manhattan proposal may have a chilling effect on'judi-
cial access and limit plaintiff returns in low-to-moderate-stakes cases, the proposal
may achieve its stated purposes in high-stakes cases. If contingent fee attorneys
escalate their commitment and become entrapped, the proportion of their returns
relative to clients' returns will be much lower than under a unregulated contingent
fee arrangement. The entrapped attorney's effort clearly exceeds that of a shirking
attorney and perhaps the optimal level as well. Therefore, in high-stakes cases the
212 See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
213 See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
214 I obtained the net return figure by adding the three actions with a positive net benefit and sub-
tracting their costs. Mathematically, this calculation is 30 + 22.5 + 15 - (3 x 12).
215 See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text
1998]
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Manhattan proposal is likely to satisfy its objective of reducing the contingent fee
attorney's share.216
However, the costs of achieving this objective may be too high given the
availability of less invasive alternatives. The Manhattan proposal may reduce ac-
cess for plaintiffs in low-to-moderate-stakes cases. Moreover, in the cases that at-
torneys accept, the Manhattan proposal exacerbates the shirking problem by in-
ducing attorneys to settle early in cases for which it is in their clients' interests to
continue. Hence, the price of increasing the client's share of case returns in high-
stakes cases is a drastic reduction in client returns in low-to-moderate-stakes cases.
Graduated payment schemes provide similar gains in client shares in high-stakes
cases without the losses in lower stakes cases. By allowing contingent fee attorneys
a one-third or greater percentage of the initial $50,000 recovered, graduated pay-
ment schemes do not alter contingent fee-attorney incentives as drastically as does
the Manhattan proposal in lower stakes cases. Yet, with a carefully selected sched-
ule of applicable percentages for greater returns, graduated schemes reduce contin-
gent fee attorney returns in the cases where many of the abuses are thought to oc-
cur.
218
VI. CONCLUSION
This research addresses the paradox of why many contingent fee attorneys
do in fact shirk while others develop reputations for excellence. 219 Attorneys who
work in the relative obscurity of low-to-moderate-stakes cases do not suffer from
glaring attention that elicits escalating commitment. Hence, such attorneys are
likely to shirk as the economic model predicts. By contrast, attorneys who work on
high-stakes and high profile cases face constant pressure to succeed due to their
exposure to scrutiny. Such scrutiny can and does elicit effort far in excess of effort
216 However, it is unclear whether escalated effort is beneficial to the plaintiff First, the plaintiff may
be better off if the case settles. An entrapped attorney resists settling for any amount that does not rationalize
his efforts. See supra notes 70-71, 77-78 and accompanying text Thus, the attorney may turn down a bene-
ficial settlement opportunity. Second, the defense attorney is likely to suffer from escalation behavior as well
since escalation tends to be exacerbated by the behavior of competitors. See supra note 81 and accompany-
ing text Therefore, the increased effort that escalation induces may be countered and neutralized by a corre-
sponding increases in defense attorney effort. This matching effect may explain why researchers have diffi-
culty finding a connection between attorney effort and outcomes. See Kritzer et al., supra note 51, at 20 n.25.
217 See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text
218 Many of the horror stories about contingent fee attorney abuse involve high-stakes cases in which
attorneys obtain returns that may equate to hourly fee rates measured in the tens of thousands of dollars
without investing substantial effort. See BRICKMAN ET AL., supra note 34, at 76 n.186 (citing the 1979 DC-
10 crash in Chicago in which at least one contingent fee attorney received $383,244 for twenty-five to thirty-
five hours of work); BRICKMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 55 n.24 (citing a 1989 Texas school bus accident
settlement for which contingent fee attorneys received more than $40 million for eight months of work).
219 Former Harvard Law School Dean Derek Bok suggests that such reputations have allowed some
contingent fee attorneys to become millionaires See supra note 39.
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provided by economics' self-interested rational attorney.220 Thus, explicit consid-
eration of face-saving and escalation together with the economic model yields a
world in which both shirking and hard-working attorneys coexist.
This augmented model has strong implications for litigation reform. The
effects of scrutiny induce not just litigators but all of us to want to look good and
do well.22' In litigation, doing well often translates into winning rather than settling
a case, especially if the litigator has previously invested substantial resources in the
case. Wanting to please and, more importantly, to not look bad elicits rationalizing
behavior that makes settling very difficult. Hence, high profile cases that do not
settle early become less likely to settle before trial or the onset of trial.' Therefore,
any litigation-reform attempts designed to elicit additional attorney effort may
compound escalation in these cases. Yet, reforms that drastically limit contingent
fee attorney payments may render many cases unattractive to attorneys leaving an
unacceptably large proportion of citizens without access to the judicial system."23
Nevertheless, it is possible to develop reforms that account for the diver-
gent dynamics between high and low-stakes cases while meeting regulatory objec-
tives. I suggest that decreasing-graduated-payment schemes go a long way towards
balancing the competing goals of maintaining access in low-stakes cases and re-
ducing excessive fees in high-stakes cases.22 4 However, there may be other perhaps
more elegant means of achieving attorney fee reform without sacrificing beneficial
characteristics of current compensation schemes. Certainly development of such
proposals requires an understanding of the implications of escalating commitment.
Only by explicitly recognizing litigator susceptibility to the psychological bias of
escalation will policy makers be able to draft reforms that address real concerns
while maintaining the legitimacy of the United States judicial system.
VII. STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Table Al contains an overview of the means and standard deviations (in
parentheses) for litigation expenditures. The CF means were consistently lower
than their CFS counterparts. However, using a student to test for differences be-
tween CF and CFS means, only the difference between total litigation expenditures
means at the $90 stakes level were statistically significant. 5 The table also shows
that CFS subjects spent amounts similar to interests-aligned subject expenditures at
220 See generally discussion supra Part III.B.
221 See generally discussion supra Part III.B.
222 See supra note 79 (discussing how the threat of impending trial can break a deadlock in litigation
and prompt a settlement).
223 See supra notes 208-211 and accompanying discussion.
224 See supra notes 218-219 and accompanying discussion.
225 For a description of this statistical test see KACHIGAN, supra note 154, at 175-181.
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low-stakes levels and exceeded interests-aligned expenditures at high-stakes levels.
However, none of these differences were statistically significant. Finally, the hourly
fee condition shows relatively constant expenditures across the three stakes levels.
These results are consistent with economic theory and the hypothesis that critical
scrutiny affects contingent fee behavior.
Table A l
Means and (Standard Deviations) of Litigation Expenditures
Total Litigation Expenditures
Stakes Interests- CFa  CFS Hourly Fee
Aligned
7 4.59
(3.14)
20 5.08 4.17 4.90 7.56
(3.65) (2.30) (3.21) (3.73)
30 6.11 5.70 7.89
(4.25) (3.42) (4.71)
60 5.74 7.78 7.90
(3.98) (3.70) (3.92)
90 5.15 8.16**
(2.60) (5.03)
CF = Contingent fee, and CFS = Contingent fee with scrutiny.
**Significantly different from same-stakes CF mean at the .05 level.
Table A2 provides additional support for the significance of scrutiny. The
table contains means of settlement groups for the four fee arrangements. Although
only the means of the CF and CFS groups at the Stakes-90 level were statistically
significant at the .05 level, the table does reveal interesting patterns in the data. The
interests-aligned groups' settlement rates did not vary substantially. The interests-
aligned subjects did appear to settle more as the stakes increased. By contrast, the
CFS subjects became less willing to settle as the stakes increased. Hourly fee and
CF settlement rates were relatively constant across stakes albeit at different levels.
The means in these tables suggest that scrutiny induces additional effort and re-
duces the probability of settlement. In addition, the data suggests that hourly fee
behavior, whether expenditures or settlement rates, is independent of the stakes.
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Table A2
Means and (Standard Deviations) of Settlement Rates
Settlement Rates
Stakes Interests- CFa  CFS' Hourly Fee
Aligned
7 .71
(.46)
20 .75 .86 .78 .61
(.44) (.36) (.42) (.50)
30 .77 .69 .65
(.43) (.47) (.48)
60 .81 .65 .52
(.40) (.49) (.51)
90 .86 .52**
(.35) (.51)
'CF = Contingent fee, and CFS' Contingent fee with scrutiny.
**Significantly different at the .05 level from the corresponding contingent fee
treatment.
Although the means reported in Tables Al and A2 are consistent with the-
ory developed here and economic theory, the tests are inconclusive. Part of the
reason for this inconclusiveness is that the tests are very weak. The test only con-
siders two means at a time when our interest is how the whole group is affected by
differences in condition. If our concern is how scrutiny affects behavior at different
stakes levels, a better test is one that considers the means at all stakes levels simul-
taneously.
Analysis of variance ("ANOVA") is the appropriate statistical technique
to test the comparison. ANOVA provides a means of understanding the source of
variation in a collection of data. This technique can be used to determine whether
different conditions produce significant levels of variation in a dependent
variable.226 For my purposes, I use ANOVA to provide an indication of whether
different fee arrangements, stakes, or scrutiny level provide significant variation in
the experimental data. If.I found significant variation due to differences in condi-
tions or stakes, then I could accept the hypothesis that the relevant variable signifi-
cantly influences subject behavior in the experiment. r Table Al contains the re-
"z For an elementary exposition of ANOVA see supra note 154, at 272.
227 Id
55
Thomas: Psychological Impact of Scrutiny on Contingent Fee Attorney Effor
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1998
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
sults of the expenditure analysis between the two contingent fee arrangements. 2 8
Table A3
Result of Analysis of Variance on Contingent Fee
Expenditure Decisions
Sources of Variance Mean Square df F p
Fee Arrangement (CF or CFS) 34.58 1 4.53 .04*
Stakes 24.30 3 3.18 .03*
Trial 16.36 1 2.14 .15
Fee Arrangement x Stakes .82 1 .11 .74
Fee Arrangement x Trial 34.17 1 4.47 .04*
Stakes x Trial 2.93 3 .38 .77
Explained Variance 16.95 10 2.22 .02*
Residual Variance 7.64 132
Total Variance 8.30 142
p <. 05.
p<.0 1 .
The Fee Arrangement variable indicates whether the data is from the CF or
CFS conditions. Stakes is self-explanatory. 2 9 The trial variable is one if the case
settled and zero otherwise. I included this variable due to the discontinuity in ex-
penditures between cases that went to trial and cases that settled. Thus, regardless
of the cost of going to trial, this variable and its interactions captured differences
between subjects who settled and those who went to trial. The remaining terms are
interaction terms that measure the covariation of two of the pure variables together.
These terms measure variation that was present when the two factors were together
or interacted. 23 The significance of Fee Arrangement in Table A3 supports Hy-
228 The F statistic is a measure of the statistical significance of the variable. The mean square for
each variable (second column) is used in the ANOVA calculation and to compute the F statistic for the vari-
able. The third column contains the degrees of freedom (d) for that variable. The p in the final column
indicates the probability that an F statistic of that magnitude occurred by chance. See Kachigan, supra note
145, at 276-279.
229 For a description of the different stakes used, see supra text accompanying notes 141-142. The
disparity (two versus four) in the number of stakes between the two fee arrangements was a source of con-
cern. This unbalance (differing number of stakes between fee arrangements) could introduce bias or noise
that would alter the data interpretation. To determine whether this was a problem, I reran this expenditures
analysis using $20 and $90 stakes only for the two fee arrangements (a balanced design). The balanced
design inferences did not change from the unbalanced design although the four factors that were significant at
the .05 level were significant at the .01 level. Hence, it appears that using the unbalanced design does not
significantly alter the analysis. Because the CF-CFS comparison presented the greatest disparity (all other
tested fee arrangements contained at least three stakes levels in common), I opted to include all available data
in the remaining tests.
230 See KACHIGAN supra note 154, at 292.
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pothesis 1 regarding the importance of scrutiny.231 The significance of stakes sup-
ports Hypothesis 2, that expenditures are greater in high-stakes contingent fee
cases.
2
Table A4
Results of Analysis of Contingent Fee and Hourly fee Arrangements
Pre-Trial Expenditures Decisions
CFS v. Interests-Aligned CFS v. Hourly
Sources of Variance F p F p
Fee Arrangement 1.09 .30 4.53 .03*
Stakes 2.04 .09 1.51 .22
Trial 3.24 .07 .91 .31
Fee Arrangement x Stakes 2.22 . .11 2.25 .11
Fee Arrangement x Trial 2.09 .15 .14 .71
Stakes x Trial .52 .72 1.82 .15
Explained Variance 6.27 <.01 ** 1.74 .07
p< .05.
p<.01.
Table A4 reports the variance analysis of differences between the contin-
gent fee and hourly fee arrangements. To include both comparisons in the same
table, Table A4 only reports F and p parameters for each comparison. Whereas the
explained variance for the CFS-interests-aligned comparison was highly signifi-
cant, none of the other terms were significant at the .05 level. In particular, the p
value for Fee Arrangement was a very large .30, there was no indication of invest-
ment decision differences between CFS subjects and interests-aligned subjects.
This result supports Hypothesis 3 in that there was no statistically significant dif-
ference between data from the two fee arrangements. 2
The comparison between data from CFS and hourly fee groups showed a
significant differencd between the fee arrangements. However, the explained vari-
ance of the analysis with p = .07 did not satisfy either of the significance thresh-
olds. So the difference observed for the fee arrangement variable cannot be ac-
cepted. The difference in spending patterns across stakes may explain this result.
Hourly fee subjects' expenditures exceeded CFS subjects' expenditures substan-
tially in low-stakes cases, whereas there was little difference between these expen-
231 See supra text accompanying notes 143-144.
232 See supra text accompanying notes 145-146.
233 See supra text accompanying notes 147.
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ditures in high-stakes cases.2 34 The high variability in one fee arrangement com-
bined with the low variability in the other was difficult for the ANOVA to capture.
It did, however, distinguish between the two fee arrangements. The non-result of
the comparison provides limited support for Hypothesis 5.235
234 See supra Table Al. Earlier empirical researchers found a similar crossover in effort expended
between hourly fee and contingent fee attorneys. See Kritzer et al., supra note 51, at 267. However, the
difference observed in this study was not large enough to conclude that CFS subjects spent more than hourly
fee subjects in high-stakes cases.
235 See supra text accompanying notes 149-151.
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